- From: Yoav Nir <synp71@live.com>
- Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2013 19:59:05 +0200
- To: Peter Lepeska <bizzbyster@gmail.com>
- CC: "William Chan (陈智昌)" <willchan@chromium.org>, HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <DUB407-EAS198E23CC7B8CD28F2B51FA7B1D40@phx.gbl>
Hey, you asked about operator incentives נשלח מה-Windows Phone שלי ________________________________ From: Peter Lepeska<mailto:bizzbyster@gmail.com> Sent: 12/4/2013 19:06 To: Yoav Nir<mailto:synp71@live.com> Cc: William Chan (陈智昌)<mailto:willchan@chromium.org>; HTTP Working Group<mailto:ietf-http-wg@w3.org> Subject: Re: What will incentivize deployment of explicit proxies? 7. Indication that proxy server intends to view data in the clear. 8. Ability for content server to say no. #7 and #8 amount to content server consent. 9. Improved experience for unsupported devices. Peter On Wed, Dec 4, 2013 at 11:50 AM, Yoav Nir <synp71@live.com> wrote: > Hi, Peter. > > Of course if legal considerations enter into it, that would affect their > decisions. Currently I don't know of any different legal status for an > explicit proxy vs a MitM proxy. > > So here are some incentives, all of which depend on how the feature is > implemented in UAs: > > 1. Just being more ethical. > 2. Get the EV indication for websites that have EV certificates. > 3. For users configuring their own device (mostly phones, but some > laptops) easier, better configuration. The story of why I need to install a > CA certificate to make a proxy work is hard to explain. This translates > directly to less helpdesk tickets. > 4. An easier time managing the proxy certificate - you can upgrade the > proxy to 2048-bit RSA or ECDSA without installing a new MitM certificate on > all devices. > 5. Reduced load - can avoid signing all those fake certificates. > 6. Ability to move the proxy out of the data path. A MitM needs to > have both the firewall functionality (preventing direct HTTPS) and the > proxy functionality on the same machine. With eproxy, the firewall can just > redirect, while the proxy can be located on the side. > > > That's just off the top of my head. Nobody puts HTTP proxies on the > perimeter gateway. There's a good reason for that. > > Yoav > > ------------------------------ > Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2013 11:06:50 -0500 > > Subject: Re: What will incentivize deployment of explicit proxies? > From: bizzbyster@gmail.com > To: synp71@live.com > CC: willchan@chromium.org; ietf-http-wg@w3.org > > > Hi Yoav, > > When I said MITM operator, I was more referring to your customers who > deploy your product. If you had two modes of operation in your product -- > MITM or explicit proxy -- which would your customers choose? What is the > incentive for them to choose eproxy? I think legal considerations may > sometimes be one of them. > > Thanks, > > Peter > > > On Wed, Dec 4, 2013 at 2:28 AM, Yoav Nir <synp71@live.com> wrote: > > On 4/12/13 3:57 AM, Peter Lepeska wrote: > > > > I wonder if MITM proxy operators have any legal concerns about viewing > content owners' traffic without their consent or even an indication that > the MITM is active. The proxy operators "own" their users' devices > presumably but not content owners' data. I think an ideal explicit proxy > would allow proxies to make their presence known to content owners. > > Hi, Peter > > Proxy vendor here. We can't make sweeping statements about legal concerns > of proxy operators, because they vary from country to country and from > state to state in federated countries. > > There are also many variables that may or may not be relevant legally or > ethically. One is the question of visibility to humans. A next generation > firewall scans the resources going through HTTP and then either transfers > them on or drops them. The traffic is never stored and never visible to any > administrator. The only thing that is visible is a log saying: "User > JohnSmith tried to GET resource https://warez.example.com/ > downloads/cracked_microsoft_office_2013.exe , which contained virus > xxxxxxxxxx". So that's metadata. Is that OK? I don't know. That's why > I'm arguing for visibility of the proxy. > > Same goes for a Caching proxy. As long as nobody sees the content, what's > the harm. If the proxy is used for reading people's emails and social > network posts, and forwarding them to the proper authorities if they seem > too subversive, the legal and ethical concerns are different. This is the > other reason why we need proxies to be explicitly configured. Without that, > all of the above proxies look the same. > > My company's product does not export HTTPS content. It's strictly a > firewall, and there's no usable way to export the data. The problem is that > there is no technical way to distinguish this kind of product from one that > does export decrypted traffic. > > Yoav > > > > > >
Received on Wednesday, 4 December 2013 18:01:51 UTC