- From: Yoav Nir <synp71@live.com>
- Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2013 16:41:22 +0200
- To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, HTTP Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <BLU0-SMTP4405008F70374202678B0BAB1EE0@phx.gbl>
On 28/11/13 1:46 PM, Stephen Farrell wrote: > Hiya, > > Cutting out lots of bits... > > On 11/28/2013 11:15 AM, Yoav Nir wrote: >> On 28/11/13 11:37 AM, Stephen Farrell wrote: > [...] >> With this proposal they can enforce their policy, allowing users to >> connect without a proxy, and not allowing them to connect with it. Seems >> like a positive to me. > You're saying that basically a bank with a policy of not agreeing > to expose their customers' credentials to proxies (or with a > regulator who imposes such a policy) would have to turn off > Internet banking for any customer behind such a proxy who uses > HTTP/2.0. No. A bank with that policy would have to turn off Internet banking period, because MitM proxies work today with HTTP/1. HTTP/2 (as opposed to /1) does not figure into this. > I've no real clue, but I'd worry that'd be a major dis-incentive > for deploying HTTP/2.0 for such a bank. (Is there even a good > way to fall back to HTTP/1.1 in such a case?) > > Doesn't that mean that the wg need to know whether or not the > above speculation is real or not before any particular proxy > solution could be adopted? (Or before someone takes the risk > of being burned as you put it:-) Currently, and until HPKP with the strict directive is deployed and supported, all HTTPS may be done behind a proxy, and it is invisible to the user. >> Having this option on the table may allow (in the far future) browsers >> to stop scaling back security in the presence of MitM proxies. > Yes, current MITM attack boxes are worse. But doing the right > thing of exposing the proxy to the web site might well mean > giving some sites a choice that requires them to not use > HTTP/2.0. Again, there is no difference between the versions of HTTP. This mechanism would work for both. We can hope that websites will do the right thing and find the correct balance between their desire for e2e security and their desire to be always available. I can't see online retailers such as Amazon blocking proxied connections. Banks might be different, but I don't think so. > There are real and hard conflicts here between the enterprise > desire to scan stuff and the web site desire for e2e security > and both need to be properly considered. > By us, or by the bank? Yoav
Attachments
- application/pkcs7-signature attachment: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature
Received on Thursday, 28 November 2013 14:41:53 UTC