- From: Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@phk.freebsd.dk>
- Date: Wed, 20 Nov 2013 00:54:29 +0000
- To: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
- cc: James M Snell <jasnell@gmail.com>, "ietf-http-wg@w3.org" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
In message <A2FCBC5B-CD83-4373-A80F-08AD860FAFD6@mnot.net>, Mark Nottingham wri tes: >For me, one of the key questions about this general approach is whether >the extra information leakage will be acceptable. I.e., an attacker will >now know the "shape" of messages -- request and response -- on the wire, >including their timing, size, relationships, etc. I think those are only relevant concerns in the 'targeted attack' model, in which case, based on what we have learned, you're likely totally screwed, even if you use TOR. I think this is a much better model for HTTP in the long run, since it opens the door to protected traffic sharing connections with unprotected traffic, for instance between outgoing proxies and servers, and it has the potential to only protect the bits which really matter, at the level of protection they need. -- Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20 phk@FreeBSD.ORG | TCP/IP since RFC 956 FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.
Received on Wednesday, 20 November 2013 00:54:52 UTC