- From: Roberto Peon <grmocg@gmail.com>
- Date: Mon, 18 Nov 2013 08:41:22 -0800
- To: Yoav Nir <synp71@live.com>
- Cc: HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAP+FsNcmcCDKaAhJH4u3b8bomu1fsaDEsM0DQDPmfjAPYFaneA@mail.gmail.com>
I suspect when we say "open" internet, we're talking about the "public" internet, btw. >From a purely engineering standpoint, we need only to ensure that the ability to do the "right thing" exists in the protocol by providing for adequate opt-out or opt-in semantics. Putting this another way: The definition of "right thing" varies. An adequately specified opt-in or opt-out mechanism for encryption allows for this varied definition. -=R On Mon, Nov 18, 2013 at 4:19 AM, Yoav Nir <synp71@live.com> wrote: > On 18/11/13 1:44 PM, Mark Nottingham wrote: > >> On 18 Nov 2013, at 10:18 pm, Yoav Nir <synp71@live.com> wrote: >> >> I think HTTP is used for so many things in so many scenarios, that >>> trying to give general guidance in the base spec is asking for trouble >>> (example: when checking certificate revocation, you use HTTP to download >>> either a CRL or an OCSP response. You can't use authenticated TLS there). >>> >> Again, we’re taking about the case of a browser on the “open” Web — the >> many special cases don’t apply here. >> >> I don't think we'll reach consensus on what is appropriate for the open > web. But I think de-coupling that discussion from the base document is a > win. I personally don't think that denying the benefits of HTTP/2 to > websites that choose not to use encryption is justified. But browser > support will be determined by market forces, unless the browser vendors > would like to form a benevolent cartel forcing the correct policy on all > the web. > > BTW: Downloading CRLs or OCSP responses to verify certificates used in > HTTPS is very much part of the open web. > > Yoav > > >
Received on Monday, 18 November 2013 16:41:49 UTC