Re: Moving forward on improving HTTP's security

I think this is a great question. I confess not to be super familiar with
the printing space, which is why Michael's repeated comments in this
working group have been very useful. I would say that my teammates and I
have not considered this issue very much, and my default inclination is to
tell IPP folks to stick with HTTP/1.X if they only want to support
cleartext. If they want HTTP/2, then they should solve the blockers to
adopting a secure transport. I realize this is a difficult thing to say to
them, and I am open to considering other options, but my teammates and I
really do care about moving all communications over a secure transport, and
holding firm to the stance of only supporting HTTP/2 over a secure
transport is one of our best mechanisms to incentivize folks to tackle the
hard problems that block secure transport (TLS or what have you) adoption.


On Thu, Nov 14, 2013 at 9:09 AM, James M Snell <> wrote:

> Ok, so this raises the question. For clarification it would be great
> if some of the folks from Chromium or Firefox could answer this:
>   - The proposal that Mark put on the table is HTTP2 over HTTPS Only
> for open Internet traffic.
>   - William has said that Chromium, at least, will ONLY support HTTP2
> over HTTPS, period, without any qualification given about "open" or
> "private" internet traffic,
>   Therefore, it would be helpful to know...
>   - If my printer running on my secure local wifi network hosts an
> HTTP/2 server without using TLS, will I be able to use Chrome to
> access my printers HTTP/2 server.
> If not, then we have a definite problem.

> - James
> On Thu, Nov 14, 2013 at 9:02 AM, Stephen Farrell
> <> wrote:
> >
> > Just on two points...
> >
> > On 11/14/2013 04:41 PM, Michael Sweet wrote:
> >> The point of all this is just that adding/requiring TLS for HTTP/2.0
> >> does not, by itself, make HTTP/2.0 more secure,
> >
> > Adding even opportunistic encryption does make things more secure.
> > Nobody sensible said anything makes things "secure" without some
> > qualification.
> >
> >> and that deploying
> >> TLS properly is not as simple as clicking a button.  Last week the
> >> prevailing assumption was that active attacks are too expensive,
> >
> > That's not correct. Lots of discussion last week related to making
> > pervasive attacks more expensive which is very different to the above.
> > For example active attacks are much more detectable and hence
> > riskier which is very different.
> >
> > Having said that I do agree that the printer/device-as-server
> > issue is a real one.
> >
> > S
> >
> >> but in the last couple days we have discovered that assumption is not
> >> correct and that MITM proxies are widely deployed already.
> >
> >

Received on Thursday, 14 November 2013 18:12:25 UTC