- From: Nicolas Mailhot <nicolas.mailhot@laposte.net>
- Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2013 12:04:56 +0100
- To: "Willy Tarreau" <w@1wt.eu>
- Cc: "William Chan (?????????)" <willchan@chromium.org>, "Adrien de Croy" <adrien@qbik.com>, "Stephen Farrell" <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>, "Mike Belshe" <mike@belshe.com>, "Tao Effect" <contact@taoeffect.com>, "Tim Bray" <tbray@textuality.com>, "James M Snell" <jasnell@gmail.com>, "Mark Nottingham" <mnot@mnot.net>, "HTTP Working Group" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
Le Jeu 14 novembre 2013 02:09, Willy Tarreau a écrit : > Eg: > there are many valid use cases for MITM right now and when you're asked to > design this and you have some consideration for privacy and security, > you'll > probably try to educate the customer to only route the connections with > certain SNIs to the MITM proxies and not the rest (just an example). Actually you're pretty much forced to whitelist the SNIs that re not to be MITM-ed today, because big operators and cloud platforms trivially defeat any attempt at lightweight control by consolidating very diverse services on the same SNIs. So operators with clearly defined SNIs that can let be passed safely are becoming the exception not the norm. I fact cloud platforms have become such a hodgepodge or safe and unsafe elements right now I'm firmly convinced that even if it was an acceptable risk to let their content pass without inspection for malware, giving up the routing information (to at least try to filter the most objectionnable parts) is becoming completely unrealistic. And TLS as it stands today does not permit this short of going to full breakage. -- Nicolas Mailhot
Received on Thursday, 14 November 2013 11:05:26 UTC