- From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@gmail.com>
- Date: Mon, 7 Oct 2013 10:00:10 -0700
- To: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
- Cc: "ietf-http-wg@w3.org WG" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
Received on Monday, 7 October 2013 17:00:37 UTC
We're talking around the same problem. What Mark has proposed allows the HTTP server to tell the HTTP client two different things: - The server has an https version of the origin available - The https version of the origin is / is not expected to validate My belief is that HTTP clients do not have enough communication with their TLS stacks to be able to use the second piece of information in a secure fashion; thus, it should be removed. Your preference seems to be that we fix TLS so that a web site can offer TLS in a way that a TLS client would not expect it to validate. That seems fine, except then there also has to a way to communicate that to both the HTTP client *and* the HTTP server. Do not assume that an HTTP server knows the type of certificate and/or validation that is done.
Received on Monday, 7 October 2013 17:00:37 UTC