Re: #385: HTTP2 Upgrade / Negotiation

On 24/10/2012, at 3:12 PM, William Chan (陈智昌) <> wrote:
>>>> Who's willing to do some experimentation? Specifically, does anyone have access to the code that was used before (IIRC, people bought some ads and inserted some Java to probe the network)?
>>> Do you mean the Chromium HTTP upgrade experiment agl referred to in
>> No, IIRC there was also some broader experimentation using ads; I'll dig around a bit more.
>> Of course, if Chrome (or any other browser) would be interested in running an experiment, we'd love to do that too -- provided we can have input into the design.
> Is there anything you'd like to change about the design in
> I'm in
> general supportive of running experiments, I just don't want to waste
> our time unless there was something deficient about the previous
> experiment.

Could you dig up the exact bytes-on-the-wire handshake that was used?

> Also, I suspect a non-Google experiment would carry more
> weight :) External validation is good.


> On that point, at Realtime Conf today, Arnout Kazemier provided a
> bunch of data on issues with WebSockets deployment.
> As he
> says "tl;dl: Always use SSL".


I'd like to validate an assumption that has been discussed in-person in a meeting (forget which one) but IIRC not yet on-list.

It's that if we can design an upgrade that fails fast and reliably for HTTP URLs, it's acceptable for there to be a (say) 70% success rate initially, with the idea that it will rise over time -- perhaps slowly, in terms of browser releases, but relatively quickly, in terms of the lifetime of HTTP.

Can we (everyone) agree upon that?

WRT WebSockets, keep in mind that the proxy/firewall/virus scanning vendors have had less than a year since it became an RFC, for a protocol that has (relatively) unproven demand and hard-to-nail-down semantics.

I suspect that HTTP2, once we finish, will be get more priority from them; the demand is already proven, and the semantics of the protocol are easier to fit into their existing threat models, etc.


Mark Nottingham

Received on Wednesday, 24 October 2012 04:51:53 UTC