Re[4]: multiplexing -- don't do it

  
I agree it's very interesting for cases like this.
  
I guess though unless enough people want to do it, and interoperate, 
then people will just do it custom until someone gets around to writing 
a profile for UDP.
  
Adrien

------ Original Message ------
From: "Poul-Henning Kamp" <phk@phk.freebsd.dk>
To: "Adrien W. de Croy" <adrien@qbik.com>
Cc: "Roberto Peon" <grmocg@gmail.com>;"Peter Lepeska" 
<bizzbyster@gmail.com>;"Mark Nottingham" <mnot@mnot.net>;"tom" 
<zs68j2ee@gmail.com>;"patrick mcmanus" 
<pmcmanus@mozilla.com>;"ietf-http-wg@w3.org" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
Sent: 8/04/2012 11:03:26 a.m.
Subject: Re: Re[2]: multiplexing -- don't do it
>In message <emc784be85-d0e8-4ced-8785-15a6435fe0f4@BOMBED>, "Adrien W. de Croy"
>writes:
>
>
>>
>>also... UDP is very problematic for DoS, since there's no established
>>connection, and therefore no verification of source.
>>
>
>
>Yes, I see little role for HTTP over UDP outside controlled environments
>for this reason.
>
>But in controlled environments, the benefits can be quite large,
>as for instance, the example I keep hearing about:  A caching
>surrogate (= Varnish) in front of webservers with lots and lots and
>lots of small objects.
>
>There is no relevant packet loss, there are no hostile actors and
>object size can be infered from URI
>
>
>--
>Poul-Henning Kamp       | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
>phk@FreeBSD.ORG         | TCP/IP since RFC 956
>FreeBSD committer       | BSD since 4.3-tahoe
>Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.
>
>
>

Received on Saturday, 7 April 2012 23:11:28 UTC