W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > ietf-http-wg@w3.org > January to March 1998


From: Dave Kristol <dmk@research.bell-labs.com>
Date: Fri, 20 Feb 98 10:12:45 EST
Message-Id: <9802201512.AA25173@aleatory.tempo.bell-labs.com>
To: http-wg@cuckoo.hpl.hp.com
X-Mailing-List: <http-wg@cuckoo.hpl.hp.com> archive/latest/5381
I was confused by a number of things.

1) What exactly is the threat?

2) I disagree that POST by itself defines an action.  It's really POST +
the host connected to + the URL accessed.

3) The Introduction points to the problem as being the Internet Printing
Protocol's binary payload.  Doesn't the same problem already occur with
file upload?

4) Which direction poses the threat?  Does the threat to security (to an
enterprise) derive from passing from the enterprise, out through a PFB,
to the outside world?  Or is there a threat from, in some fashion,
passing from the outside world, through a PFB, into an enterprise

5) Suppose we add a new method to HTTP for the IPP.  Do we also have to
add a new method to HTTP for each such application, with each method
having tightly constrained semantics?

6) I think the "cat is out of the bag" on POST.  Assume new,
application-specific methods.  Should a restrictive administrator ban
POST and insist that all applications migrate to new POST-like methods
with exposed semantics?

7) Isn't IPP a "red herring"?  What restrictive administrator can
configure to "deny all, selectively allow" even now, given the huge
range of forms that users inside the enterprise may wish to use.

8) It seems to me that the paper presumes a particular firewall
architecture and then describes how protocols should be designed to
accommodate it.  That seems folly in the absence of a standard to which
PFBs are designed.

Dave Kristol
Received on Friday, 20 February 1998 07:17:09 UTC

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.4.0 : Thursday, 2 February 2023 18:43:04 UTC