W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > www-rdf-interest@w3.org > March 2000

Re: Subclass of Thing/Resource

From: greg fitzpatrick <greg.fitzpatrick@mailbox.swipnet.se>
Date: Mon, 27 Aug 1956 22:44:02 +0000
Message-Id: <200003071936.UAA05300@mb09.swip.net>
To: bill dehora <wdehora@cromwellmedia.co.uk>, marja-riitta koivunen <marja@w3.org>, dan brickley <daniel.brickley@bristol.ac.uk>, guha <guha@epinions-inc.com>
CC: www-rdf-interest <www-rdf-interest@w3.org>

>From Bill dehOra 
:From Greg FitzPatrick

:whereas each possible communicator has varying access to you

>But they don't have varying access to *me*. They have varying access to
>layers of software that surrogate *for* me (that why it's called an agent),
>assuming no layer has not been coopted. That is very different. Each added
>level of indirection is a security risk.

Are we agreeing or disagreeing here?

:As a shopper it is in your advantage to let the seller know as 
:much about yourself as possible.  

>That's debatable in scenarios involving commodities, and highly debatable
>where the consumer has a clear picture of what they want, or where
>bargaining is possible. It might be relevant for the sale of customised

You are being  picayunish, Bill.  Obviously Disney did not wish the Citrus
farmers of Orlando to know how badly they wanted to build Disney World just
there, and someone desiring to purchase large parcels of a companies stock
may not feel like explaining why and  of course in bargaining,  parties
might benefit by secrecy, but ... all market places generally thrive on
transparency  and the efficient flow of information. There is a multibillion
dollar industry out there concerned with gathering information about *you*. 
The effective matching of supply and demand is basic to all business models.
 Give me a break!       

:You would be more willing to give this 
:information if you were assured that your 
:identity was never to be divulged and 
:you would be more secure in your privacy 
:knowing that your agent and not the seller
:was allowed privy to your true identity.

>How might we be 'assured' of security in such matters? Consequentially how
>can we be assured of anonymity in such transactions? While it may be
>inconvenient that people's data is dislocated, is limits damage to them in
>the event of identity theft. 

In a normal life, we extend trust to banks, credit card companies, 
governments, priests, doctors, psychologists, car mechanics, and  postmen. 
It is part of the deal.  

>The idea that centralised digital identities are resources that are not
>going to be abused or cracked is frankly naive, and I cannot imagine an
>assurance sufficient in this scenario, unless security is built in from the
>very beginning, which is certainly not the case with rdf or the semantic

Naive - sure
going to be abused or cracked - yeah probably now and then
security built in from the beginning - of course 
not the case with rdf of the semantic web -  huh???

Received on Tuesday, 7 March 2000 14:37:15 UTC

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