Re: Some major edits just checked in. - tls errors

Great job. 

> - Error conditions are enumerated and mapped to error signalling
> classes, along the lines of my previous message and Serge's
> proposal.  This part includes Johnath's language about (not)
> keeping browser status, as revised by Tim Hahn. (The result from
> ACTION-376.)
> 
> The concrete choices of signalling levels here are strawmen.

http://www.w3.org/2006/WSC/drafts/rec/rewrite.html#sec-tlserrors

"When the URL corresponding to the transaction at hand does not match the 
certificate presented, and a validated certificate is used, then error 
signalling of level warning or above (6.4.3 Warning/Caution Messages , 
6.4.4 Danger Messages) MUST be used."

This one seems like a low ball to me. The whole point of the TLS server 
authentication is to match the certificate to the URL. Why is the low bar 
on this warning, instead of always danger? 

and conversely:

"If TLS negotiation otherwise fails, error signalling of level danger (
6.4.4 Danger Messages) MUST be used."

I have no user intuition about this. Why is this danger?