- From: Harry Halpin <hhalpin@w3.org>
- Date: Thu, 05 Feb 2015 12:39:16 +0100
- To: Ryan Sleevi <sleevi@google.com>, David Leon Gil <coruus@gmail.com>
- CC: Billy Simon Chaves <b.simon@hermes-soft.com>, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>, "public-web-security@w3.org" <public-web-security@w3.org>, "public-webcrypto-comments@w3.org" <public-webcrypto-comments@w3.org>, Siva Narendra <siva@tyfone.com>, Brad Hill <hillbrad@fb.com>, GALINDO Virginie <Virginie.Galindo@gemalto.com>, Lu HongQian Karen <karen.lu@gemalto.com>, Wendy Seltzer <wseltzer@w3.org>, POTONNIEE Olivier <Olivier.Potonniee@gemalto.com>, "PHoyer@hidglobal.com" <PHoyer@hidglobal.com>
On 02/05/2015 01:30 AM, Ryan Sleevi wrote: > On Wed, Feb 4, 2015 at 4:11 PM, David Leon Gil <coruus@gmail.com> wrote: >> So, a nit I have with WebCrypto/whatever at the moment, related to this issue. >> >> If I want to make a webapp that stores unextractable keys, I can store >> them in IndexedDB. A browser can implement IndexedDB by providing a >> store that is, e.g., a Sqlite3 database on disk. With all of these >> "unextractable" keys stored in plaintext. > > The spec is explicitly clear that this is a valid implementation > strategy, although not required of implementors. > >> Every browser, however, does have an internal keystore > > False. No specification requires this of Web Browsers. What some > browsers do (and again, not all of them do this) is not the same as > all browsers. > >> (e.g., for >> passwords). And (some of them) use the best available protection their >> platform provides to protect entries in it. > > And that protection varies by platform to considerable extent, thus > providing zero effective guarantees to a Web developer, short of > coding platform-specific logic in the Web - which is, of course, > exactly what the Web shouldn't do - or by requiring all platforms > accessing the Web have some degree of restricted control capabilities > that quickly borderlines on Trusted Computing. While Ryan is right as regards the current lack of any kind of consistent security properties of browser storage of keys, that seems like a suitable topic for future exploration for possible standardization. It's definitely a bug, not a feature, in my book insofar as storing user's private material in plaintext on the client side (and under server) control does likely violate the assumptions most people I know have about cryptographic protocols. > >> I'd be happy if I could just store one entry in that keystore: A KEK >> to wrap all of the keys when they're at rest. >> >> But right now, as far as I know, I can't. >> >> - dlg > > Correct. That is by design. >
Received on Thursday, 5 February 2015 11:39:34 UTC