W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > ietf-http-wg@w3.org > October to December 2015

Re: SSL/TLS everywhere fail

From: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2015 13:54:25 +0100
To: Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@phk.freebsd.dk>
Cc: Jacob Appelbaum <jacob@appelbaum.net>, Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz>, ietf-http-wg@w3.org
Message-ID: <20151206125425.GB28069@1wt.eu>
On Sun, Dec 06, 2015 at 12:33:13PM +0000, Poul-Henning Kamp wrote:
> --------
> In message <CAFggDF1NOskxyAdJkamuhM5EmPhcdwfKz9q4y5+SgaCFBWJ6sA@mail.gmail.com>
> , Jacob Appelbaum writes:
> 
> >>> Not exactly. We have started with unencrypted connections that lack
> >>> confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. Moving to TLS gives us
> >>> all three with a computational cost and within certain boundaries.
> >>
> >> The tired old argument against "TLS-everywhere" is that TLS does *not*
> >> offer all three of those.
> >
> >That argument is wrong when we consider how it is used in practice. As
> >an example, we upgrade a protocol from HTTP to HTTPS - we gain those
> >properties within certain bounds.
> 
> For "within certain bounds" read:
> 
> 	"Except any actor which has a trojan or captured CA - which
> 	means any non-incompetent state actor and many highly
> 	competent non-state actors."

Oh and BTW, how many of those who bought their smartphones from their
mobile operator verified that the operator has not pre-installed its
own CA in the phone to offer a "better experience" to their customers ?
By "better experience", you can understand "benefit from caching and
parental control without having to go through the difficult steps of
adding their CA yourself". And of course benefit from everything else
you didn't want to benefit from...

Willy
Received on Sunday, 6 December 2015 12:54:56 UTC

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.1 : Tuesday, 1 March 2016 11:11:40 UTC