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Re: SSL/TLS everywhere fail

From: Jacob Appelbaum <jacob@appelbaum.net>
Date: Sun, 6 Dec 2015 13:47:08 +0000
Message-ID: <CAFggDF1ouuNG8T_VG336YFrPeocJu+3ZBUS1Kie+hz5Euha-sw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@phk.freebsd.dk>
Cc: Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz>, ietf-http-wg@w3.org
On 12/6/15, Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@phk.freebsd.dk> wrote:
> --------
> In message
> <CAFggDF1NOskxyAdJkamuhM5EmPhcdwfKz9q4y5+SgaCFBWJ6sA@mail.gmail.com>
> , Jacob Appelbaum writes:
>
>>>> Not exactly. We have started with unencrypted connections that lack
>>>> confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. Moving to TLS gives us
>>>> all three with a computational cost and within certain boundaries.
>>>
>>> The tired old argument against "TLS-everywhere" is that TLS does *not*
>>> offer all three of those.
>>
>>That argument is wrong when we consider how it is used in practice. As
>>an example, we upgrade a protocol from HTTP to HTTPS - we gain those
>>properties within certain bounds.
>
> For "within certain bounds" read:
>
> 	"Except any actor which has a trojan or captured CA - which
> 	means any non-incompetent state actor and many highly
> 	competent non-state actors."
>

What is your estimate for the number of actors here with one or both capability?

My estimate is that malware is everywhere and certificates are less so.

In both cases, I think it is *higher* when we have unencrypted
connections - removing the requirement for a CA and it ensures that
malware can easily propagate as every connection to any service
creates a vector for infection.

All the best,
Jacob
Received on Sunday, 6 December 2015 13:47:38 UTC

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