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Re: SSL/TLS everywhere fail

From: Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@phk.freebsd.dk>
Date: Sun, 06 Dec 2015 12:33:13 +0000
To: Jacob Appelbaum <jacob@appelbaum.net>
cc: Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz>, ietf-http-wg@w3.org
Message-ID: <52005.1449405193@critter.freebsd.dk>
--------
In message <CAFggDF1NOskxyAdJkamuhM5EmPhcdwfKz9q4y5+SgaCFBWJ6sA@mail.gmail.com>
, Jacob Appelbaum writes:

>>> Not exactly. We have started with unencrypted connections that lack
>>> confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. Moving to TLS gives us
>>> all three with a computational cost and within certain boundaries.
>>
>> The tired old argument against "TLS-everywhere" is that TLS does *not*
>> offer all three of those.
>
>That argument is wrong when we consider how it is used in practice. As
>an example, we upgrade a protocol from HTTP to HTTPS - we gain those
>properties within certain bounds.

For "within certain bounds" read:

	"Except any actor which has a trojan or captured CA - which
	means any non-incompetent state actor and many highly
	competent non-state actors."

-- 
Poul-Henning Kamp       | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20
phk@FreeBSD.ORG         | TCP/IP since RFC 956
FreeBSD committer       | BSD since 4.3-tahoe    
Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence.
Received on Sunday, 6 December 2015 12:33:36 UTC

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