- From: Joseph Ashwood <jashwood@arcot.com>
- Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2001 18:24:44 -0800
- To: "Yongge Wang" <ywang@certicom.com>
- Cc: "Xml Encrypt \(E-mail\)" <xml-encryption@w3.org>
----- Original Message ----- From: "Yongge Wang" <ywang@certicom.com> Cc: "Xml Encrypt (E-mail)" <xml-encryption@w3.org> > > Well the security reason is that if the signature doesn't include enough > > randomness then the signature can be guessed. Which leads to potential > > compromises. > > First I think this is a XML-DSIG problem. I believe it is a problem with the line between them. BUt if I were to place it in one generically I would agree, however the DSIG spec is effectively done, so the place to make changes to the line would be here. > Secondly, > DSA and ECDSA all require to have a random seed "r" > for each signature. Yes but with both cases the original hash can be found with vastly diminished work. So the effect is that of publishing the hash (with some extra workload), which is exactly where the problem started. > And the security issues are discussed > in the DSA or ECDSA standard. It is not a problem for > XML-Encryption. Actually there is surprisingly little discussion about the entropy content issues in either the DSS or SHS papers (DSA and SHA-1). They generally simply assume that the problems of hash algorithms and signatures is known, the proof of usability supplied by the papers is of little use because they provide proof of difficulty of changing the hash value. > Also generally the signatures are on > plaintext. I think much of this discussion is on what needs to be considered plaintext. If the data will be enrypted either the signature needs to be a part of that plaintext, or the signature needs to be performed on the ciphertext. > So this is really no reason to exclude > the case that one can sign on a plaintext. Most > contract are signed on plaintext (of course, need to > hash it first). However you will still have to have the decryption key to verify that signature, which means there is no reason at all to leave the signature in the open, and significant risk associated with it. Based on this I see very significant reasons to specifically exclude the simultaneous operation of encryption and signing. We need to enforce that they are serialized. If the encryption happens before the signing there is not problem. If the encryption happens after the signing there needs to be a some method in place that will disallow guessing attacks. Since the prime target for this seems to be credit cards which have significantly less than 64-bits of entropy the reasonable decision would be to simply not do it (to do it securely you have to blend the encryption and signature, which would put it outside the scope of the encryption and dsig groups). All that will happen by exposing signatures on data that is later encrypted is the exposure of another potential method of attack. Joe
Received on Monday, 26 March 2001 21:25:21 UTC