- From: Ed Simon <ed.simon@entrust.com>
- Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2001 19:12:56 -0500
- To: "'Philip Hallam-Baker'" <pbaker@verisign.com>, "'Joseph M. Reagle Jr.'" <reagle@w3.org>, Sanjeev Hirve <shirve@cyberelan.com>
- Cc: xml-encryption@w3.org
- Message-ID: <A0E1DEC54ED42F4884DD9EEA00ACE37106D0A4@sottmxs08.entrust.com>
I am in agreement with following provisos: 1. I definitely agree we should allow the use of XSLT to allow encryption or arbitrary fragments, such as attributes, but I don't think we should make it required for encrypting attributes (if indeed the WG decides encrypting attributes is a good idea). Though I'm a big fan of XSLT, I'm not convinced it is the best approach for supporting attribute encryption. A big difference between XSLT/XPath in XML Signature and in XML Encryption, is that in Signature it need only be one-way because you don't reconstruct the original data from the hash. In Encryption, your mode 2 (as I understand it) requires an XSLT transformation for encrypting attributes and then another XSLT for the reverse transformation to go from the encrypted version to the plaintext. 2. In XML Signature, you can sign attributes with the lightweight XPath rather than XSLT. However, XPath, which is basically a point and retrieve mechanism, is not capable of doing the transformations required by mode 2; you can use it to select a subset for encrypting but you cannot use XPath to recreate the original, that requires XSLT. Though XSLT is more powerful, it also requires more processing capability which, I think, is one major reason why XPath was supported for XML Signature. Phill, please clarify some things for me: 1. Do you think XML Encryption should specify a mechanism for encrypting attributes? 2. Do you think that XML Encryption should discuss the use of XSLT transformations like those you have described for mode 2? 3. If the answer to question 2 is yes, do you think that XML Encryption should specify syntax for XSLT transformations analagous to XML Signature's <XSLT> element? Regards, Ed -----Original Message----- From: Philip Hallam-Baker [mailto:pbaker@verisign.com] Sent: Monday, January 08, 2001 5:46 PM To: 'Joseph M. Reagle Jr.'; Sanjeev Hirve Cc: Philip Hallam-Baker; xml-encryption@w3.org Subject: RE: Attribute encryption It is easier to ignore a message signature than message encryption. But XML Signature is certainly not 'transparent' in the sense that the signature can be scoped to arbitrary message fragments - without the use of another XML layer. It is possible to use XSLT or XPath to identify and sign a fragment of an XML message. It would seem sensible to allow the use of XSLT to allow encryption of arbitrary fragments of an XML message. Equally it is possible for applications to profile XSLT and XPATH or avoid them entirely while using XML Signature. I think that as presently specified XML Signature and Encryption have compatible and comparable approaches. Phill > -----Original Message----- > From: Joseph M. Reagle Jr. [mailto:reagle@w3.org] > Sent: Monday, January 08, 2001 3:34 PM > To: Sanjeev Hirve > Cc: Philip Hallam-Baker; xml-encryption@w3.org > Subject: Re: Attribute encryption > > > At 15:11 1/8/2001 -0500, Sanjeev Hirve wrote: > > >Case 2: > > > Message B states only that it is in schema PQR which > is the standard > > schema for the application and incorporates the XML > > > encryption schema. The node encryption was considered at > the time the > > schema was created. > >In this case, the schema designer, primarily an business > expert, must also > >tale into account encryption requirements, sometimes there may be > >conflicting design goals. This assumption could be fraught with > >pitfalls. It may be better to keep security as > "transparent" as possible. > > In general, this is the approach we took in xmldsig. We could > not presume > that schema authors would know about xml signature/encryption > and design > their schema accordingly. > > __ > Joseph Reagle Jr. > W3C Policy Analyst mailto:reagle@w3.org > IETF/W3C XML-Signature Co-Chair http://www.w3.org/People/Reagle/ >
Received on Monday, 8 January 2001 19:15:47 UTC