- From: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie>
- Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 16:27:38 +0000
- To: www-xkms@w3.org
- Message-ID: <3C45A9FA.5BEA5F89@baltimore.ie>
Since I was asking for folks to send their comments on the requirements draft by today, I felt I should send mine:-) If you can, please try to send yours today or tomorrow so that we can see what to have on the agenda for next week's conference call and have a chance to discuss things on the list prior to the call, Regards, Stephen. -- ____________________________________________________________ Stephen Farrell Baltimore Technologies, tel: (direct line) +353 1 881 6716 39 Parkgate Street, fax: +353 1 881 7000 Dublin 8. mailto:stephen.farrell@baltimore.ie Ireland http://www.baltimore.com
XKMS requirements General - Suggest changing to MUST/SHOULD/MAY ala rfc 2119, i.e. capitalize all normative must/should/may and leave non-normative ones lower case - Should there be a mention of being consistent/compatible with SAML? - Key recovery: I think we're only in the business of defining how a user can recover her own key and don't (say) have to define how two administrators can recover my key for law enforcement purposes. Am I right here? (Comments below assume that I am, strangely enough:-) - There should be an explicit requirement or goal stated that the data formats etc. that the trust service uses internally must not "leak" over the xkms protocol, at least if you're not using some private extension. - Should we require that the specification define how to use a 4-cornered approach at this stage (could be in a separate document, like xbulk). I argue that we should (I think). Specific Abstract: "external requirements" sounds wrong, suggest deleting the phrase Status: "http://www.w3.org/TR/" as the source of drafts. This (and other xkms drafts) aren't there. I'm checking if this is the right URL, but I guess the WG overview page is the alternative. Introduction: Still not quite clear that we're not doing symmetric key management. Suggest changing opening to "XML-based public key management should be designed...", also "...to support the public key management requirements of..." Terminology: Should this be section "1.1" or just part of "1" or "2" (I at least don't know how to fix the numbering, but I guess it should be done.) Asynchronous exchange: - s/require a/requires a/ - Nice to add an example, say "...is incomplete, e.g. when processing a registration requires time consuming checks,..." - "response status of "Pending"" should be an example in case there's some other way to do it - Should we define asynchronous exchange so that in addition to indicating a pending status, the response should/must include an indicator as to how the complete response can be received (e.g. a check-back URL)? Deferred authentication: - Maybe this would be better termed "Deferred request authentication" since e.g. one of the CMP PoP schemes gives out an encrypted certificate so that only the holder of the right private key can send a confirm message. That CMP example could also be a type of deferred authentication, but is different from what's meant here. Key Validation: - Maybe a mine-field, in which case ignore this, but would suggest that the 1st sentence be replaced with "A service that verifies the binding of information to a public key, and also determines the current status of that binding, if appropriate/possible for the information in question." KeyBinding: - Change to "Key Binding" (two words) here since we're not in schema-land yet - s/additional elements/additional information/ since there might (in principle at least) be XML attributes in there too KeyName: - s/KeyName/Key Name/ - s/not required and not required/not required/ though I do like the emphasis:-) Pass Phrase: - Should the term used really be "Pass Phrase Key"? - s/may be provided/may be used/ Proof of Possession: - Capatalize "possession" - s/POP/PoP/ is more usual - s/ownership/possession/ Section 2.1: Universality and Usability - item 4: There was an issue with which SOAP version to use on the SAML list today, we should check that out and hopefully come to the same conclusion - item 7: Suggest adding "prefereably through the use of an external specification" to give the hint that we don't want to spend out lives considering privacy - item 9: s/for a each/for each/ - item 12: Is defined a bit strong here? Maybe "allowed" or say that the capability must be demonstrated - don't want to have to include every legacy format that someone finds, which could be argued from the current wording Section 2.2: Security model: - There's a bit of repetition in this section, needs some editorial work. - item 0: First sentence should have a number, right? Suggest changing this to:" The specificaiton must specify how to secure messages for confidentiality, data integrity and data origin authentication, though use of these mechanisms must not be mandatory at the message level, e.g. confidentiality and origin authentication may be provided via a secure transport mechanism like TLS." - item 1: s/trust responder/trust service/ since the latter is the defined term; need to define "payload security"; s/SSL/TLS/ - item 2: not sure what's meant, but I would understand s/taken/used/ - item 3: refers both to SOAP and XMLP - should use one; maybe it should be s/body content/body/; also s/used/usable/ - item 5: delete "interoperable" since TLS already is, right:-) Also suggest adding "e.g. by only requiring a subset of the mandatory ciphersuites be supported" to explain why a profile of TLS is useful - item 7: since I (at least) don't know how XTAML might be used, suggest deleting that (no harm since there's already the certificate example which makes the point) - item 8: s/using either/using for example/ and some wording glitches need fixing (e.g. s/in security section/in a security considerations section/); I'd rather we deleted the last sentence since I don't like "optional" things and I'd always like to (at least try) have replay protection. - item 9: s/an XML key management standard/the specification/ - item 11: I don't understand this one but I think you mean "trust services must make their public keying information (i.e. public keys to be used to authenticate the trust service), publically available in at least the <ds:KeyValue> format, since that it the minimal [XMLDSIG] key representation" or words to that effect? - item 12: s/must always/must/ Section 2.3: protocol design - item 2: the defined term is "key binding" so s/public key assertion/key binding/ - item 3: s/the update to/update/ - item 4: need to make it clear that we're only thinking about a user recovering their own key and not, e.g., two administrators recovering my key for law enforcement purposes, so suggest adding "...so that a user may recover their own key. Note: the specification shall not define how e.g. administrators can recover the keys of users which is out of scope of the current work." - items 5,6,7: Suggest adding to each: "...but must not make this mandatory to support for "typical" clients" since we do want to separate out the more complex (e.g. bulk) cases - item 8: is "key attributes" right here? (possible confusion with XML attributes?), maybe "...types of <ds:KeyInfo>" - item 9: make it clear that this only refers to the protocol, since we're not defining what happens inside a responder in this case, right? maybe s/how to/define protocol that allows/ - item 10: should "4-corner" be a defined term? I think so, but don't have text right now. Section 2.4: Out of scope - items 4&15: if the general comment about 4-corners is adopted then these might need modification, I've no text at the moment - item 13: well, I'd like it to be possible to use xkms (esp locate) anonymously - shouldn't we allow that? OTOH, I wouldn't like to spend too much time on it either, so how about adding at the end "...are not a primary focus of the work, though may be supported" Section 3 overall: - Maybe make it clear that you're expected to be familiar with the XKMS W3C Note before reading this part? Section 3.1: Trust server - item 1: seems to conflict with item 2.4.14, where we rule out roaming for now, suggest deleting this one 'till we add back roaming - item 3: suggest s/selection of services/selection of differently configured trust services/ - item 5: "both registration and services responses" - should that be "both registration requests and responses"? If not, I don't understand Section 3.2: Payload and protocol definition - item 7: I don't understand this one. - item 8: "number of responses" seems wrong, maybe "number of key bindings in a response" is what's really meant? - item 12: s/assertions/key bindings/ Section 3.3: Objects - item 3: is it may or must? I'd go for must. (and s/assertion/key binding/) - item 4: the X.509 part seems to be defining some sort of conformance classes - is this right or should we either make X.509 a must or a may? Also, I don't understand the last sentence, but think it should probably be a separate item? Section 3.4: Processing - item 2: what does "namespace aware" really mean? I've no idea at any rate;-) - item 5: s/define an authentication mechanism/define any new authentication mechanism/ - item 7: just trails off...I guess it should end with "...key binding." - item 8: s/arranged/agreed/ would be more common usage Section 4: Co-ordination - Doesn't co-ordination have a hyphen? - Rephrase 1st sentence. Maybe "The specification should aim to be consistent with the following external specifications/groups:..."
Received on Wednesday, 16 January 2002 11:26:47 UTC