- From: Melvin Carvalho <melvincarvalho@gmail.com>
- Date: Fri, 26 Sep 2014 14:18:10 +0200
- To: Tim Berners-Lee <timbl@w3.org>
- Cc: Public TAG List <www-tag@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CAKaEYhLhfR1Gsx7TGCP+iSJpVA0qG06CGjjpwZRuLntnVxFmKQ@mail.gmail.com>
On 26 September 2014 14:11, Tim Berners-Lee <timbl@w3.org> wrote: > XMLHTTPRequest restrictions by origin are driving me crazy. > > Every week it seems some code which used to work perfectly fine has been > blocked by ever-increasing security restrictions on what XMLHTTPRequest can > do. > > > For example, a test file which used to work fine in > /devel/ > github.com/linkeddata/tabulator-firefox/content/js/rdf/test/index.html > now gives an error: (e.g. Chrome:) > XMLHttpRequest cannot load file:///devel/ > github.com/linkeddata/tabulator-firefox/content/js/rdf/test/tc0006/test_UUU.js?_=1411730688738. > Received an invalid response. Origin 'null' is therefore not allowed access. > > > I test things in file: space where i can edit them and reload fast. > I normally assume that a program I running file: space is going to run and > access to whatever I have access to -- it is a trusted program in the unix > model. (Yes, in an ideal world would I trap things which are untrusted in > a Downloads directory for example and given them less access? Yes, but > until we have a system like that, can we allow scripts in files to access > files? > > Other recent battles have been about Firefox getting confused as to when > credentials should be sent, and as a result blocking in insecure access or > now sending credentials on a secure one. > > Ooops - here is another. > XMLHttpRequest cannot load > http://www.w3.org/2000/10/rdf-tests/rdfcore/amp-in-url/test001.nt. No > 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' header is present on the requested resource. > Origin 'https://linkeddata.github.io' is therefore not allowed access. > The 14-year-old test data now has to have its .htaccess files tweaked. > > Maybe, instead of asking every publisher of public content to change their > config files, we either ask users to say they are not receiving the benefit > of any "behind the firewall" or IP-authenticated material, or for that > matter suggest those who do use those methods must change *their* servers > to add a header saying that. > > This is probably the wrong list to send this to, and this must have been > wargamed by the community before now -- maybe someone could provide me a > pointer to the report. > +1 I understand CORS is there for our own security, but also encountered many issues of this kind. Any way the pain could be reduced would be greatly appreciated. > > Tim >
Received on Friday, 26 September 2014 12:18:38 UTC