W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > www-tag@w3.org > December 2014

Re: Draft finding - "Transitioning the Web to HTTPS"

From: Chris Palmer <palmer@google.com>
Date: Wed, 17 Dec 2014 15:36:07 -0800
Message-ID: <CAOuvq23Foe1NSv-hevGorPSoDH2s6jWmtSFHG45yT=MfQ8BCZw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Marc Fawzi <marc.fawzi@gmail.com>
Cc: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>, "Sean B. Palmer" <sean@miscoranda.com>, "www-tag@w3.org List" <www-tag@w3.org>
On Wed, Dec 17, 2014 at 8:46 AM, Marc Fawzi <marc.fawzi@gmail.com> wrote:

> Btw, on a related subject, stuff like "signed scripts" which were proposed
> on this list by an independent developer (with the conclusion being that
> signing a script at least assures that it's not be altered) might be part of
> a more perfect foundation. The argument I heard here against Web Crypto over
> HTTP (or more comprehensively stuff like OpenPGP.js which used by Google for
> its End-to-End security plugin) for client-to-server secure exchange is that
> MITM can alter the script, but a signed script would solve that, so
> regardless of whether you use a CA or not you should be able to get pretty
> good privacy, right? (assuming signed scripts or signed Chrome/Firefox
> hosted apps)

Think about this. What would the root of trust for script signatures
be? Perhaps script execution environments could be born with the
public keys of trusted third parties that vouch for the identities of
script authors...


If you are referring to Sub-Resource Integrity (SRI), at least the
top-level page that includes the resources has to be served over
HTTPS, so that the SHA-256 hashes for the sub-resources are at least
minimally trustworthy. So you haven't really avoided the secure
transport requirement for WebCrypto.

(Of course, I argue that even the sub-resources must be served over
secure transport, even for/especially for SRI. But that's a whole
other thread.)
Received on Wednesday, 17 December 2014 23:36:34 UTC

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.4.0 : Friday, 17 January 2020 22:57:08 UTC