- From: Slein, Judith A <JSlein@crt.xerox.com>
- Date: Fri, 26 Feb 1999 15:00:08 -0500
- To: "'Yaron Goland'" <yarong@microsoft.com>, "Slein, Judith A" <JSlein@crt.xerox.com>, "Davis, Jim <jdavis@parc.xerox.com>" <jdavis@parc.xerox.com>, WEBDAV WG <w3c-dist-auth@w3.org>
I like it. --Judy > -----Original Message----- > From: Yaron Goland [mailto:yarong@microsoft.com] > Sent: Friday, February 26, 1999 2:24 PM > To: 'Slein, Judith A'; Davis, Jim <jdavis@parc.xerox.com>; WEBDAV WG > Subject: RE: Issue #4: ref-integrity interoperabilityu > > > I will go you one better. Not only should the client be able > to discover > what types of referential integrity the server supports but the answer > should be properly scoped with the class of integrity. For example: > > <d:supportedtypes> > <d:referencetype> > > <d:referencetypename><m:xeroxintegrity/></d:referencetypename> > <d:enforced/> > </d:referencetype> > </d:supportedtypes> > > The client will only understand the "d" scoped elements. So > the client knows > that the reference uses some sort of referential integrity which is > identified by the m:xeroxintegrity element but has no idea > what the actual > policy is. The client is then free to submit the URL which matches > m:xeroxintegrity as an argument to the Ref-Integrity header > when creating > the reference. > > In this case the client is choosing to intentionally enter a > non-interoperable situation. That is always their right. But > the protocol > must be written so that entering this situation is a clear and obvious > action. I believe that requiring the client to parse supportedtypes, > referencetype, pull out the name from referentypename and match it to > enforced more than adequately demonstrates that the client > really wants to > shoot itself in the head. > > Yaron > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Slein, Judith A [mailto:JSlein@crt.xerox.com] > > Sent: Friday, February 26, 1999 11:00 AM > > To: Davis, Jim <jdavis@parc.xerox.com>; WEBDAV WG > > Subject: RE: Issue #4: ref-integrity interoperabilityu > > > > > > I'd like to emphasize again that this choice would make it > > for all practical > > purposes impossible for a client to create a reference except with > > Ref-Integrity: do-not-enforce. The only references that > can really be > > created would be ones for which the server promises *not* to enforce > > referential integrity. That seems to me unacceptable. > > > > I would be willing to go along with this *only if* we provide > > some way for > > the client to discover what other values of Ref-Integrity a > > given server > > understands. We could do that with OPTIONS. Then, even if > the client > > doesn't understand what the acceptable values mean, it can > > just pick an > > arbitrary one if it wants referential integrity enforced, > > assuming that > > every value the server advertises will be some flavor of enforcing > > referential integrity. I think the most common case will be > > that the server > > offers only one policy for enforcing referential integrity. > > > > Then we can still hope that in the long run a common set of > > referential > > integrity policies will emerge and be standardized, but in > > the short run > > clients will be able to request referential integrity if they > > want it. And > > it will be possible for compliant servers to insist on > > enforcing referential > > integrity. > > > > --Judy > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > > From: Jim Davis [mailto:jdavis@parc.xerox.com] > > > Sent: Friday, February 26, 1999 1:07 PM > > > To: WEBDAV WG > > > Subject: Re: Issue #4: ref-integrity interoperabilityu > > > > > > > > > At 10:36 PM 2/21/99 PST, Yaron Goland wrote: > > > >(Issue #4) Section 4.3.1 - ... I propose that the > > > Ref-Integrity header > > > MUST be included in > > > >all requests and that the only defined value be > > > DAV:do-not-enforce. A server > > > >receiving this header with an unrecognized value MUST fail > > > the request. > > > > > > I agree. > > > > > > No need to repeat his reasoning. > > > > > > > > >
Received on Friday, 26 February 1999 14:55:53 UTC