Re: [ontolog-forum] RDF finally has its long awaited Generic Client!

John,

I can try to figure out what Milton means if he answers questions (It's
always interesting to be Socrates). You've chosen the one closest to yours
from "a continuous infinity of possible starting points."

I write here from time to time that the most commonly used knowledge,
presented as theories in various textbooks, articles, and lectures, is
selected for formalization. You can say: don't formalize the Geometry of
Hilbert, Euclid, or Tarski. And so on for physical theories, and then say
the same to every computer scientist and ontologist formalizing in RDF,
OWL2, CL(🤝), Isabelle, Coq, or Lean.

A strange proposition for our community of practice.

Formalization is not the creation of new knowledge. It is the formalization
of existing, human-verified knowledge for reliable processing by computers.

It should be added that we formalize (some would say, crudely, "cram" them
into a computer) not only theories, but also their models and methods for
solving problems about the properties of these models [1]. We spend our
entire lives constructing theories and their models, and testing them in
practice by solving various problems: Close your eyes and solve the problem
of taking a sip from your cup of tea.

LLMs show that knowledge can be concentrated, but who better than you to
know that it can be concentrated in a much more compact and reliable way,
without any brute force.

Alex

[1] Specific tasks of Ugraphia on a particular structure (formulations,
solutions, placement in the framework)
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/380576198_Specific_tasks_of_Ugraphia_on_a_particular_structure_formulations_solutions_placement_in_the_framework>

"This document describes a specific framework of specific tasks about a
particular structure posed and solved GNaA Fig.1.1 within the framework of
a specific theory, namely Ugraphia, the theory of undirected graphs, with
little involvement of the theory of binary relations, Binria. The task
framework stores the formulation and solution of tasks in a structured form
and is intended for use by everyone in the world (be it the world of a
research group or Humanity): having set a task on the structure before
solving it on their own, a person can look into the task framework and see:
perhaps it has already been solved. The structure and tasks about it are
described in the first paragraph of the first chapter of [GSiA]."


ср, 1 окт. 2025 г. в 21:00, John F Sowa <sowa@bestweb.net>:

> Alex,
>
> I totally agree with Milton.
>
> MP:  The problem here is the implicit discussion about knowledge,
>  knowledge representation and formal knowledge representation.  These are
> three distinct layers and because we still do not have a firm grip on the
> first, which is inextricably linked to consciousness . . . . .
>
> I have been saying something very similar to this point again, and again,
> and again.
>
> I'll repeat once more, starting with Milton's point above. For any kind of
> knowledge representation, there is a continuous infinity of possible
> starting points and levels of detail or scope.  Every attempt at
> formalization must make a choice among an infinitely of options.
>
> Therefore, the probability that your choice of what to formalize is
> correct for anybody else is 1 divided by the total number of options -- in
> other words, 1 divided by infinity.
>
> That value is very, very close to *ZERO*.   Therefore, your project of
> formalization is *WORTHLESS*.
>
> So *DON'T *do it.
>
> John
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
> *From*: "Alex Shkotin" <alex.shkotin@gmail.com>
>
> Hi Milton,
>
> What do you think about representation of our theoretical knowledge as
> axiomatic theories?
>
> Alex
>
> ср, 1 окт. 2025 г. в 18:10, Milton Ponson <rwiciamsd@gmail.com>:
>
> As a mathematician I cannot suppress a chuckle here. The problem here is
> the implicit discussion about knowledge,  knowledge representation and
> formal knowledge representation
> These are three distinct layers and because we still not have a firm grip
> on the first, which is inextricably linked to consciousness,  knowledge
> representation remains a difficult task to accomplish, and consequently
> formal knowledge representation, which we are seeking will remain elusive.
> Large language models ignore the first layer and assume we can use token
> based systems to create knowledge representation emulation systems that can
> capture all formal knowledge representation systems.
> If one looks at the groundbreaking paper MIP*=RE,
> https://arxiv.org/abs/2001.04383, and what it states about the Connes
> embedding conjecture being false, this should ring a bell.
> Because we cannot in all cases assume that a finite matrix in a very high
> dimensional space can approximate a simulation of an infinite dimensional
> space.
> Which means that no matter how high we make the dimension and consequently
> the number of parameters used, in some cases the simulations will never
> even get close to approximate a finite accurate model of infinite space.
> Which means generative LLMs are are a mathematical dead end, and will be
> the reason why the AI bubble riding on generative LLMs will burst.
>
> Milton Ponson
> Rainbow Warriors Core Foundation
> CIAMSD Institute-ICT4D Program
> +2977459312
> PO Box 1154, Oranjestad
> Aruba, Dutch Caribbean
>
>
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