- From: Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com>
- Date: Fri, 4 Jun 2021 16:05:37 -0400
- To: semantic-web@w3.org
On 6/4/21 12:44 PM, Dan Brickley wrote: > If an attacker switched the context for just the right second or two In a properly implemented system, there is no "if the attacker switch the context for just the right second or two". If this attack works on your system, you have an insecure system. Full stop. This is a known attack vector and there are known attack mitigations against it. To draw an analogy, this is like saying: "If you decide to not use a nonce in your digital signature, an attack can perform a replay attack against you." Well, yes... they can... and nonces prevent that, so... use nonces. > there may be gullible workflows in which they could get nasty triples > parsed and signed, without other care being taken. It seems an avoidable > class of cornercases to have to work around. These aren't corner cases... being gullible will almost guarantee attack vectors. This is what the security considerations section is for, even if we take JSON-LD out of the mix... what about if you're gullible and blindly concatenate TURTLE documents together and someone resets @base? What if you don't set the base URL? These are security considerations and the group will have to entertain them in *any* RDF serialization. I appreciate that you're trying to reduce scope, but removing JSON-LD from the list of serializations and expecting that it buys us a significant amount of saved time feels misguided. Unless I'm misunderstanding what you're suggesting. You are suggesting that we take JSON-LD out of scope, right? -- manu -- Manu Sporny - https://www.linkedin.com/in/manusporny/ Founder/CEO - Digital Bazaar, Inc. blog: Veres One Decentralized Identifier Blockchain Launches https://tinyurl.com/veres-one-launches
Received on Friday, 4 June 2021 20:06:22 UTC