- From: Anthony Moretti <anthony.moretti@gmail.com>
- Date: Thu, 21 Jan 2021 10:45:13 -0600
- To: Maria Keet <maria.keet@uct.ac.za>
- Cc: Margaret Warren <mm@zeroexp.com>, Dan Brickley <danbri@danbri.org>, Hugh Glaser <hugh@glasers.org>, Jos De Roo <josderoo@gmail.com>, Patrick J Hayes <phayes@ihmc.us>, Semantic Web <semantic-web@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <CACusdfQgUQwKdVtwHoDzwccE_-8o_xSUvBjFXU66H+fPdjfr-Q@mail.gmail.com>
Great explanation, it satisfies me, thank you Maria! I'll check out the survey and the tool too, thanks a lot. Anthony On Thu, Jan 21, 2021 at 1:29 AM Maria Keet <maria.keet@uct.ac.za> wrote: > Hi Antony, > > They are not equally expressive, because you have another ‘fundamental > element’. Those roles of relations can be used to express constraints that > are not available to assert in the standard view because it lacks that > element to declare them on, notably subsetting and disjointness of roles. > Of course, one can transform and approximate. > > If the philpapers survey is anything to go by [1], then it doesn’t look > like that there will be one that prevails from an ontological viewpoint. > Pragmatics and such might lead to one or the other becoming dominant, but > even that is a far stretch to assume it will happen. To see that, you can > play with various scenarios in the foundational Ontology Selection and > Explanation Tool [2], where different requirements for one’s domain > ontology can end up as a different best-fit foundational ontology (only a > few of them were included). This would be likewise for standard view vs > positionalist—the latter comes in handy in implementations, so it is > unlikely to be cast aside by the conceptual data modelling community, but > the former has less ‘clutter’ in the logical theory and so tends to be > preferred there. > > [1] https://philpapers.org/surveys/results.pl > [2] first version, and as jar file http://www.meteck.org/files/onset/, v2 > as swf for download and an online version (also flash): > http://www.thezfiles.co.za/ROMULUS/ontologySelection.html. The content > that went into the tool as comparison tables: > http://www.thezfiles.co.za/ROMULUS/ontologyComparison.html > > Regards, > Maria > > On 20/01/2021 22:29, Anthony Moretti wrote: > > CAUTION: This email originated outside the UCT network. Do not click any > links or open attachments unless you know and trust the source. > > Thanks Maria. Similarly to the 3D/4D distinction though, if both views of > relations are equally expressive and the aim is standardization is it not > just a matter of choosing one? > > Another point from others that I'm not sure how much weight to give is how > long people have been arguing about these things. Mathematicians have > argued forever about the foundations of mathematics, but as far as I know > since the 1920s the majority have settled on ZFC, and even though it's not > the only possible foundation it's been useful for those 100 years. So in > the same vein isn't it possible that we might also eventually settle on a > system even though there are many? > > Anthony > > On Wed, Jan 20, 2021 at 1:23 PM Maria Keet <maria.keet@uct.ac.za> wrote: > >> Hi Anthony, >> >> One can refine the 'fundamental' relations (though there is no agreement >> on what they are) and add sub-relations as finer-grained ones cf all on par >> or more/less compact as variations in encodings, but even if you were to >> agree on that, then that still does not resolve disagreements as to the >> nature of what a relation is and those distinctions still would result in >> different upper ontologies. The two well-known ones in use are called >> 'standard view' and 'positionalist'. >> >> The standard view is baked into in OWL and first order predicate logic: >> there's a relation/relationship/objectproperty and a fixed order to its >> participants. in shorthand notation, e.g., for loves(John, Mary) or, at the >> type level, partOf(Heart,Human), then John has to take up the first place >> in the relation and Mary the second, not the other way around--that John >> loves Mary doesn't mean that it is reciprocated in that loves(Mary, John) >> would hold as well, and likewise for partOf. When the participants are >> swapped in their order, we seemingly have to have another relation to stay >> true to the state of affairs, say, lovedBy(Mary,John) and >> hasPart(Human,Heart), respectively. >> >> It's easy to declare loves & lovedBy and partOf & hasPart inverses of one >> another, sure, but one can argue (among other reasons) that it's not right >> to need two relations for the same state of affairs between John and Mary >> or between Human and Heart. Instead, there are two ways to talk of the same >> relation that holds between its participants. One of the ways to address it >> is positionalism. >> With the positionalism, there's only one relation--say, loving and >> parthood, respectively--and it relegates loves, loved by, part of, has part >> and so on to a language layer. That relation in positionalism consists of n >> unordered roles in the n-ary relation, where each participant plays a >> designated role. Indicating such roles within square brackets, then writing >> it down as >> loving([lover],[beloved]) >> or >> loving([beloved],[lover]) >> is all the same, but we need a function that assigns John to [lover] and >> Mary to [beloved]; e.g., play(John,[lover]) and play(Mary,[beloved]). One >> can do likewise for parthood and any n-ary relation (alike >> R([role1],[roleA],[role-i])). Alternatively, it can be seen as taking >> projections over the participants in the relations. It's a common notion in >> UML class diagrams with its association ends and EER with the >> non-directional relationships and its relationship components, as well as >> in ORM (Object-Role Modelling). >> >> Positionalism asserts that there are such roles that make up relations >> and that they are essential components of relations, whereas the standard >> view does not admit them into the universe, which is irreconcilable >> ontologically. This is an orthogonal issue to the 3D/4D distinction that >> Pat described, so there we go with adding more to the proliferation of >> upper ontologies. >> >> Regards, >> Maria >> >> ---- >> Dr. Maria Keet >> Associate Professor >> Department of Computer Science >> University of Cape Town >> Cape Town, South Africa >> tel: +27 21 650 2667 >> fax: +27 21 650 3551 >> email: mkeet@cs.uct.ac.za >> work: http://www.cs.uct.ac.za >> home: http://www.meteck.org >> >> >> >> On 20/01/2021 17:40, Anthony Moretti wrote: >> >> CAUTION: This email originated outside the UCT network. Do not click any >> links or open attachments unless you know and trust the source. >> >> Thanks for the example Marcel. Can’t the relations from the simple >> representation and the complex representation coexist under the same >> hypothetical “SUO” though? >> >> Anthony >> >> On Wed, Jan 20, 2021 at 8:46 AM Margaret Warren <mm@zeroexp.com> wrote: >> >>> That's a great idea, Dan..I would be willing to work on this. >>> >>> -------- Original message -------- >>> From: Dan Brickley <danbri@danbri.org> >>> Date: 1/20/21 09:31 (GMT-05:00) >>> To: Jos De Roo <josderoo@gmail.com> >>> Cc: Hugh Glaser <hugh@glasers.org>, Patrick J Hayes <phayes@ihmc.us>, >>> Semantic Web <semantic-web@w3.org> >>> Subject: Re: [EXT] Upper ontologies >>> >>> If it were in a wiki somewhere it could approximate a book... >>> >>> On Wed, 20 Jan 2021 at 13:45, Jos De Roo <josderoo@gmail.com> wrote: >>> >>>> Did exactly the same, appended Pat's posting to local file pat.txt >>>> Thanks Pat !!! >>>> >>>> Jos >>>> >>>> -- https://josd.github.io/ <http://josd.github.io> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jan 20, 2021 at 1:34 PM Hugh Glaser <hugh@glasers.org> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Thanks Pat - an excellent and well-timed posting. >>>>> I will save it for future use and savouring. >>>>> >>>>> I think that the discussion illustrates the problem. >>>>> Upper Ontology is a concept. >>>>> Some people conceive of it as singular. >>>>> Others as plurality. >>>>> >>>>> > On 20 Jan 2021, at 06:17, phayes@ihmc.us wrote: >>>>> > >>>>> > OK, I had promised myself to stay out of these discussions, but … >>>>> > >>>>> > No, this will not work. It has been tried, many times. Every >>>>> existing upper ontology was built by people who honestly believed that they >>>>> would do this, and were willing in some cases to sacrifice years of their >>>>> professional lives to achieve this. I was part of several of these >>>>> initiatives, some of them financed by agencies like the US Army and DARPA. >>>>> But still we have a host of upper ontologies. >>>>> > >>>>> > And there is a good reason why this happens. Yes, we are all talking >>>>> about the same one world. And let us assume, for the purposes of argument, >>>>> that we are all using the same formalism. (Of course not true, but >>>>> translating between formalisms is relatively straighforward.) Still, we >>>>> will not all create the same ontology, or even compatible ontologies. (I >>>>> called this the "diamond of confusion" in a talk about 20 years ago.) And >>>>> this is because an ontology is, in Tom Gruber's phrase, a formalization of >>>>> a /conceptualization/, not a formalization of /reality/. And while there is >>>>> widespread agreement on the nature of the actual world, there is most >>>>> emphatically not universal agreement on conceptualizations of it. People >>>>> are still arguing about ontological conceptualizations that were discussed >>>>> by the Greek philosphers 2000 years ago. >>>>> > >>>>> > I can illustrate this with a very old, /very/ thoroughly discussed >>>>> example, which is how to describe things that are extended in time. That >>>>> is, things in the physical world, not abstract things like numbers or >>>>> ideas. There are two main ways to think about this. >>>>> > >>>>> > In one, often called the 4d perspective, all things in time and >>>>> space occupy some chunk of time and of space, and we describe them by >>>>> talking about their parts, including their temporal 'slices'. So I – >>>>> PatHayes4 – am a four-dimensional entity, and we can say things like [**] >>>>> > Weight(PatHayes4@2020) > Weight(PatHayes4@1966) >>>>> > to express the regrettable fact that I am getting heavier. The @ >>>>> symbol here is a function that takes a time-extended thing (me, in this >>>>> case) and a time, and returns a time-slice of that temporally exended >>>>> thing. So PatHayes4@1966 is a thing that I might call 'Me in 1966', >>>>> and PatHayes4 is me throughout my lifetime. The me who is present at any >>>>> particular time, such as now, is only one momentary timeslice of the entire >>>>> PatHayes4. >>>>> > >>>>> > In another way of thinking, there is a fundamental distinction >>>>> between 'things' (like you and me) and 'events' which happen. (Other >>>>> terminologies are often used: continuants vs occurrents or perdurant vs >>>>> endurant. I will stick to things and events.) Things are 3-d, dont have >>>>> temporal 'parts', and are identically the same thing as time passes. (They >>>>> continue as time passes; they endure.) Events happen, are temporally >>>>> extended and have temporal parts. In a nutshell, things are 3-d, events are >>>>> 4-d. So a football match, a wedding ceremony, a theatre performance are all >>>>> events, but the players, guests and actors (and many other things) are >>>>> things. And a guest at the wedding just as he arrives is identically the >>>>> very same thing as when he is going home after the wedding, though his >>>>> properties may have changed. Time parameters are typically arguments of >>>>> properties rather than attached to names, so that my getting fatter might >>>>> be written >>>>> > Weight(PatHayes3, 2020) > Weight(PatHayes3, 1966). Note that the >>>>> first arguments of these two are identical. >>>>> > >>>>> > I will not go into the pros and cons of these perspectives. Each of >>>>> them has been a foundational perspective for an upper ontology in >>>>> widespread use, and each has been successful. Users and proponents of each >>>>> have published detailed philosophical defenses of them and critiques, >>>>> sometimes bordering on slander, of the other. Each of them "works". But >>>>> they are profoundly incompatible. >>>>> > >>>>> > The problem is that the 'things' of the second perspective are >>>>> /logically impossible/ in the first perspective, since they have no >>>>> temporal parts or extents – they are purely 3-d. So the thing PatHayes3 >>>>> cannot be identified with PatHayes4. But it also cannot be identified with >>>>> any particular 'slice' of PatHayes4, since these have different properties, >>>>> but PatHayes3 is identically the same thing at different times. There >>>>> simply isn't room in the 4d ontology for things like PatHayes3 which have >>>>> no temporal extent yet exist at different times. So, one might respond, the >>>>> worse for 3-d things: but in the second perspective, those 3-d things are >>>>> the basic fabric of reality, so wthout them there cannot be any events to >>>>> happen to them. >>>>> > >>>>> > This incompatibility is not just a philosophical issue: it has >>>>> ramifications all through the ontologies, affecting how entities must be >>>>> classified, the syntactic form of the sentences that describe them, even >>>>> how many of them there are. People learning how to use these ontological >>>>> frameworks have to learn to /think/ in distinctly different ways. >>>>> > >>>>> > As my friends know, I could expand on this topic at much greater >>>>> length, but maybe this will serve to give an idea why the naive idea of >>>>> just 'choosing the best pieces' of a variety of upper (or lower, for that >>>>> matter) ontologies is not going to work, any more than trying to make a >>>>> hybrid car by just taking the best parts of Ford Tbird and an electric golf >>>>> cart. >>>>> > >>>>> > There is a reason this field is called 'ontological engineering'. >>>>> > >>>>> > Pat Hayes >>>>> > >>>>> > [**] This fragment of formalization is absurdly simplified, but it >>>>> captures the heart of the matter. >>>>> > >>>>> >> On Jan 18, 2021, at 8:49 AM, Mikael Pesonen < >>>>> mikael.pesonen@lingsoft.fi> wrote: >>>>> >> >>>>> >> >>>>> >> This is the way I see it too, if there would be effort for the >>>>> common UO. Take the best parts of the existing UOs and harmonize them. >>>>> >> >>>>> >> One would think it would also save some work in future for anyone >>>>> making domain ontologies. Just choose the best point of view from “Standard >>>>> Upper Ontology” and start building on it (if there were more than one point >>>>> of view available in "SUO"). >>>>> >> >>>>> >> On 17/01/2021 3.46, John wrote: >>>>> >>> I think the issue of upper ontologies could be relatively >>>>> straightforward. Some esteemed organization (W3C?) should initiate an upper >>>>> ontology working group that would become a major effort. By major effort I >>>>> don’t mean going to the moon or Mars, but something very major indeed. It >>>>> would probably require funding from multiple governments to reach the >>>>> necessary scale of effort. It would select an eminent group of experts as >>>>> the core working group members who would have the final say in defining the >>>>> “standard upper ontology”. Inputs would be requested from a very wide >>>>> source of developers to be considered by the working group. Th e goal of >>>>> the working group would be to identify, as best as possible, what is true >>>>> and meaningful in terms of relationships and what is not. A good starting >>>>> point would be measurements and geographic classes and properties. There is >>>>> a lot of good work already in these areas that could be leveraged. The next >>>>> job would be to identify a constrained list of the top-level real world >>>>> things that most domain specific ontology would need to reference. The >>>>> ultimate release of the “Standard Upper Ontology” would serve the widest >>>>> categories of ontology developers and they would all be strongly encouraged >>>>> to use the standard in order to achieve the maximum interoperability. Those >>>>> ontology developers who simply cannot live with the standard could go there >>>>> own way, but realizing they have given up the opportunity to seamlessly >>>>> interoperate with the majority of the Semantic Web community. >>>>> >>> >>>>> >>> John Flynn >>>>> >>> Semanticsimulations.com >>>>> > >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Hugh >>>>> 023 8061 5652 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >> Disclaimer - University of Cape Town This email is subject to UCT >> policies and email disclaimer published on our website at >> http://www.uct.ac.za/main/email-disclaimer or obtainable from +27 21 650 >> 9111. If this email is not related to the business of UCT, it is sent by >> the sender in an individual capacity. Please report security incidents or >> abuse via https://csirt.uct.ac.za/page/report-an-incident.php. >> > > Disclaimer - University of Cape Town This email is subject to UCT policies > and email disclaimer published on our website at > http://www.uct.ac.za/main/email-disclaimer or obtainable from +27 21 650 > 9111. If this email is not related to the business of UCT, it is sent by > the sender in an individual capacity. Please report security incidents or > abuse via https://csirt.uct.ac.za/page/report-an-incident.php. >
Received on Thursday, 21 January 2021 16:45:42 UTC