Re: [EXT] Upper ontologies

Thanks for the example Marcel. Can’t the relations from the simple
representation and the complex representation coexist under the same
hypothetical “SUO” though?

Anthony

On Wed, Jan 20, 2021 at 8:46 AM Margaret Warren <mm@zeroexp.com> wrote:

> That's a great idea, Dan..I would be willing to work on this.
>
> -------- Original message --------
> From: Dan Brickley <danbri@danbri.org>
> Date: 1/20/21 09:31 (GMT-05:00)
> To: Jos De Roo <josderoo@gmail.com>
> Cc: Hugh Glaser <hugh@glasers.org>, Patrick J Hayes <phayes@ihmc.us>,
> Semantic Web <semantic-web@w3.org>
> Subject: Re: [EXT] Upper ontologies
>
> If it were in a wiki somewhere it could approximate a book...
>
> On Wed, 20 Jan 2021 at 13:45, Jos De Roo <josderoo@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Did exactly the same, appended Pat's posting to local file pat.txt
>> Thanks Pat !!!
>>
>> Jos
>>
>> -- https://josd.github.io/ <http://josd.github.io/>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Jan 20, 2021 at 1:34 PM Hugh Glaser <hugh@glasers.org> wrote:
>>
>>> Thanks Pat - an excellent and well-timed posting.
>>> I will save it for future use and savouring.
>>>
>>> I think that the discussion illustrates the problem.
>>> Upper Ontology is a concept.
>>> Some people conceive of it as singular.
>>> Others as plurality.
>>>
>>> > On 20 Jan 2021, at 06:17, phayes@ihmc.us wrote:
>>> >
>>> > OK, I had promised myself to stay out of these discussions, but …
>>> >
>>> > No, this will not work. It has been tried, many times. Every existing
>>> upper ontology was built by people who honestly believed that they would do
>>> this, and were willing in some cases to sacrifice years of their
>>> professional lives to achieve this. I was part of several of these
>>> initiatives, some of them financed by agencies like the US Army and DARPA.
>>> But still we have a host of upper ontologies.
>>> >
>>> > And there is a good reason why this happens. Yes, we are all talking
>>> about the same one world. And let us assume, for the purposes of argument,
>>> that we are all using the same formalism. (Of course not true, but
>>> translating between formalisms is relatively straighforward.) Still, we
>>> will not all create the same ontology, or even compatible ontologies. (I
>>> called this the "diamond of confusion" in a talk about 20 years ago.) And
>>> this is because an ontology is, in Tom Gruber's phrase, a formalization of
>>> a /conceptualization/, not a formalization of /reality/. And while there is
>>> widespread agreement on the nature of the actual world, there is most
>>> emphatically not universal agreement on conceptualizations of it. People
>>> are still arguing about ontological conceptualizations that were discussed
>>> by the Greek philosphers 2000 years ago.
>>> >
>>> > I can illustrate this with a very old, /very/ thoroughly discussed
>>> example, which is how to describe things that are extended in time. That
>>> is, things in the physical world, not abstract things like numbers or
>>> ideas. There are two main ways to think about this.
>>> >
>>> > In one, often called the 4d perspective, all things in time and space
>>> occupy some chunk of time and of space, and we describe them by talking
>>> about their parts, including their temporal 'slices'. So I – PatHayes4 – am
>>> a four-dimensional entity, and we can say things like [**]
>>> > Weight(PatHayes4@2020) > Weight(PatHayes4@1966)
>>> > to express the regrettable fact that I am getting heavier. The @
>>> symbol here is a function that takes a time-extended thing (me, in this
>>> case) and a time, and returns a time-slice of that temporally exended
>>> thing. So PatHayes4@1966 is a thing that I might call 'Me in 1966', and
>>> PatHayes4 is me throughout my lifetime. The me who is present at any
>>> particular time, such as now, is only one momentary timeslice of the entire
>>> PatHayes4.
>>> >
>>> > In another way of thinking, there is a fundamental distinction between
>>> 'things' (like you and me) and 'events' which happen. (Other terminologies
>>> are often used: continuants vs occurrents or perdurant vs endurant. I will
>>> stick to things and events.) Things are 3-d, dont have temporal 'parts',
>>> and are identically the same thing as time passes. (They continue as time
>>> passes; they endure.) Events happen, are temporally extended and have
>>> temporal parts. In a nutshell, things are 3-d, events are 4-d. So a
>>> football match, a wedding ceremony, a theatre performance are all events,
>>> but the players, guests and actors (and many other things) are things. And
>>> a guest at the wedding just as he arrives is identically the very same
>>> thing as when he is going home after the wedding, though his properties may
>>> have changed. Time parameters are typically arguments of properties rather
>>> than attached to names, so that my getting fatter might be written
>>> > Weight(PatHayes3, 2020) > Weight(PatHayes3, 1966).  Note that the
>>> first arguments of these two are identical.
>>> >
>>> > I will not go into the pros and cons of these perspectives. Each of
>>> them has been a foundational perspective for an upper ontology in
>>> widespread use, and each has been successful. Users and proponents of each
>>> have published detailed philosophical defenses of them and critiques,
>>> sometimes bordering on slander, of the other. Each of them "works". But
>>> they are profoundly incompatible.
>>> >
>>> > The problem is that the 'things' of the second perspective are
>>> /logically impossible/ in the first perspective, since they have no
>>> temporal parts or extents – they are purely 3-d. So the thing PatHayes3
>>> cannot be identified with PatHayes4. But it also cannot be identified with
>>> any particular 'slice' of PatHayes4, since these have different properties,
>>> but PatHayes3 is identically the same thing at different times. There
>>> simply isn't room in the 4d ontology for things like PatHayes3 which have
>>> no temporal extent yet exist at different times. So, one might respond, the
>>> worse for 3-d things: but in the second perspective, those 3-d things are
>>> the basic fabric of reality, so wthout them there cannot be any events to
>>> happen to them.
>>> >
>>> > This incompatibility is not just a philosophical issue: it has
>>> ramifications all through the ontologies, affecting how entities must be
>>> classified, the syntactic form of the sentences that describe them, even
>>> how many of them there are. People learning how to use these ontological
>>> frameworks have to learn to /think/ in distinctly different ways.
>>> >
>>> > As my friends know, I could expand on this topic at much greater
>>> length, but maybe this will serve to give an idea why the naive idea of
>>> just 'choosing the best pieces' of a variety of upper (or lower, for that
>>> matter) ontologies is not going to work, any more than trying to make a
>>> hybrid car by just taking the best parts of Ford Tbird and an electric golf
>>> cart.
>>> >
>>> > There is a reason this field is called 'ontological engineering'.
>>> >
>>> > Pat Hayes
>>> >
>>> > [**] This fragment of formalization is absurdly simplified, but it
>>> captures the heart of the matter.
>>> >
>>> >> On Jan 18, 2021, at 8:49 AM, Mikael Pesonen <
>>> mikael.pesonen@lingsoft.fi> wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >>
>>> >> This is the way I see it too, if there would be effort for the common
>>> UO. Take the best parts of the existing UOs and harmonize them.
>>> >>
>>> >> One would think it would also save some work in future for anyone
>>> making domain ontologies. Just choose the best point of view from “Standard
>>> Upper Ontology” and start building on it (if there were more than one point
>>> of view available in "SUO").
>>> >>
>>> >> On 17/01/2021 3.46, John wrote:
>>> >>> I think the issue of upper ontologies could be relatively
>>> straightforward. Some esteemed organization (W3C?) should initiate an upper
>>> ontology working group that would become a major effort. By major effort I
>>> don’t mean going to the moon or Mars, but something very major indeed. It
>>> would probably require funding from multiple governments to reach the
>>> necessary scale of effort. It would select an eminent group of experts as
>>> the core working group members who would have the final say in defining the
>>> “standard upper ontology”. Inputs would be requested from a very wide
>>> source of developers to be considered by the working group. Th e goal of
>>> the working group would be to identify, as best as possible, what is true
>>> and meaningful in terms of relationships and what is not. A good starting
>>> point would be measurements and geographic classes and properties. There is
>>> a lot of good work already in these areas that could be leveraged. The next
>>> job would be to identify a constrained list of the top-level real world
>>> things that most domain specific ontology would need to reference. The
>>> ultimate release of the “Standard Upper Ontology” would serve the widest
>>> categories of ontology developers and they would all be strongly encouraged
>>> to use the standard in order to achieve the maximum interoperability. Those
>>> ontology developers who simply cannot live with the standard could go there
>>> own way, but realizing they have given up the opportunity to seamlessly
>>> interoperate with the majority of the Semantic Web community.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> John Flynn
>>> >>> Semanticsimulations.com
>>> >
>>>
>>> --
>>> Hugh
>>> 023 8061 5652
>>>
>>>
>>>