# Re: Logic As Formal Semiotic

From: Story Henry <henry.story@bblfish.net>
Date: Wed, 1 Aug 2007 15:43:50 +0200
Message-Id: <948049C2-1F8C-47AB-A535-471AEA7C543D@bblfish.net>
Cc: Ontolog Forum <ontolog-forum@ontolog.cim3.net>, Semantic Web Forum <semantic-web@w3.org>, Arisbe <arisbe@stderr.org>, Inquiry <inquiry@stderr.org>
To: Jon Awbrey <jawbrey@att.net>
```
I need to read Donald Davidson [1] again, but he had a very
interesting observation taken from Tarski, namely that truth is a
predicate that applies to sentences.

"Snow is white" is true in English if and only iff Snow is white .

in the general case

"S" is true in L <=> S

Truth is therefore disquotational . It is a way of removing the
quotes from a statement.

Another way of looking at it is as follows. You have a resource
<http://john.eg/foaf.rdf>.
You get a representation back of which you can say

<http://john.eg/foaf.rdf> log:semantics { :joe a foaf:Person } .

if you believe it is true then you can add it to your database.

:joe a foaf:Person .

Now the other way of looking at truth is that there is a relation
between statements and reality.
That still holds. If you accept as true statements that are wrong,
reality will soon remind you of your mistake.

Henry

[1] Truth and Interpretation

On 1 Aug 2007, at 15:26, Jon Awbrey wrote:
> What is truth?  It's a property of a sign, or a representation,
> that makes it a good sign, a representation that is so natured
> or so designed as to further the achievement its proper object.
```
Received on Wednesday, 1 August 2007 13:44:07 UTC

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