- From: Frederick Hirsch <Frederick.Hirsch@nokia.com>
- Date: Fri, 24 Apr 2009 16:24:45 -0400
- To: XMLSec WG Public List <public-xmlsec@w3.org>
- Cc: Frederick Hirsch <Frederick.Hirsch@nokia.com>
fyi regards, Frederick Frederick Hirsch Nokia Begin forwarded message: > From: Frederick Hirsch <frederick.hirsch@nokia.com> > Date: April 24, 2009 4:21:30 PM EDT > To: TEG <technology@projectliberty.org> > Cc: "Hirsch Frederick (Nokia-CIC/Boston)" <Frederick.Hirsch@nokia.com> > Subject: Comment requested on removing DTD definitions from XML > Signature 1.1 and on elliptic curve > > (1) The W3C XML Security working group is considering removing DTD > definitions from XML Signature 1.1 and XML Encryption 1.1 and only > providing XML Schema definitions in these specifications [1]. > > If this is a concern please indicate the concerns and rationale on the > XML Security WG comment list at public-xmlsec-comments @ w3.org. This > list is publicly archived at http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-xmlsec-comments/ > > (2) The XML Security WG would also like to refine the question about > the suitability of elliptic curve as a mandatory to implement > algorithm for XML Signature 1.1 by highlighting that the scope of > elliptic curve is greatly limited in what is proposed to be mandatory > in XML Signature 1.1. The specific curve being used in an instance > of ECDSA is important and there are a few sets of well-known > ("named") curves that have been standardized. The P-256, P-384 and > P-521 curves are three of the five NIST-defined prime curves. > > Since the publication of the First Public Working Draft of XML > Signature 1.1, the following clarifying text was added by the XML > Security WG to the end of section 6.4.3 of XML Signature 1.1 [2]: > > "This specification REQUIRES implementations to support the > ECDSAwithSHA256 signature algorithm, which is ECDSA over the P-256 > prime curve specified in Section D.2.3 of FIPS 186-3 [FIPS186-3] (and > using the SHA-256 hash algorithm). It is further RECOMMENDED that > implementations also support ECDSA over the P-384 and P-521 prime > curves; these curves are defined in Sections D.2.4 and D.2.5 of FIPS > 186-3, respectively." > > It is important to realize that by reducing the scope of the > requirement to a specific curve that this should simplify evaluation > of whether it is desirable to make this mandatory to implement. > > The XML Security WG would also like to note the importance of this > algorithm to US Government customers, as evidenced by their adoption > of Suite B [3]. This is reflected in the XML Security WG Use Cases > and Requirements document in section 3.5.2.3 [4]. > > If you have feedback on the suitability of the mandatory to implement > requirement for ECDSAwithSHA256 algorithm, please indicate on the > public comment list. A similar question applies to ECDH-ES mandatory > for XML Encryption 1.1. > > (3) if you have any comment on any of the documents recently published > by the XML Security WG [1] we would appreciate feedback on the public > comments list. > > Thank you > > regards, Frederick > > Frederick Hirsch, Nokia > Chair XML Security WG > > [1] http://www.w3.org/2008/xmlsec/wiki/RoadmapandPublicationStatus > > [2] http://www.w3.org/2008/xmlsec/Drafts/xmldsig-core-11/Overview.htm > > [3] Fact Sheet NSA Suite B Cryptography, http://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/index.shtml > > [4] http://www.w3.org/TR/2009/WD-xmlsec-reqs-20090226/#algorithm- > suiteb > > > >
Received on Friday, 24 April 2009 20:25:36 UTC