- From: Frederick Hirsch <Frederick.Hirsch@nokia.com>
- Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2009 06:33:11 -0400
- To: XMLSec WG Public List <public-xmlsec@w3.org>
- Cc: Frederick Hirsch <Frederick.Hirsch@nokia.com>
fyi. This should close ACTION-258. regards, Frederick Frederick Hirsch Nokia Begin forwarded message: > From: "Hirsch Frederick (Nokia-CIC/Boston)" <Frederick.Hirsch@nokia.com > > > Date: April 8, 2009 6:30:09 AM EDT > To: Web Applications Working Group WG <public-webapps@w3.org> > Cc: "Hirsch Frederick (Nokia-CIC/Boston)" <Frederick.Hirsch@nokia.com> > Subject: [widget-digsig] Pls review: Additional considerations on > elliptic curve algorithms to consider > > The XML Security WG would like to refine the question about the > suitability of elliptic curve as a mandatory to implement algorithm > for XML Signature 1.1 by highlighting that the scope of elliptic > curve is greatly limited in what is proposed to be mandatory in XML > Signature 1.1. > > As T-Mobile pointed out previously in their comments [1], the specific > curve being used in an instance of ECDSA is important and there are a > few sets of well-known ("named") curves that have been standardized. > The P-256, P-384 and P-521 curves are three of the five NIST-defined > prime curves. > > Since the publication of the First Public Working Draft of XML > Signature 1.1, the following clarifying text was added by the XML > Security WG to the end of section 6.4.3 of XML Signature 1.1 [2]: > > "This specification REQUIRES implementations to support the > ECDSAwithSHA256 signature algorithm, which is ECDSA over the P-256 > prime curve specified in Section D.2.3 of FIPS 186-3 [FIPS186-3] (and > using the SHA-256 hash algorithm). It is further RECOMMENDED that > implementations also support ECDSA over the P-384 and P-521 prime > curves; these curves are defined in Sections D.2.4 and D.2.5 of FIPS > 186-3, respectively." > > It is important to realize that by reducing the scope of the > requirement to a specific curve that this should simplify evaluation > of whether it is desirable to make this mandatory to implement. > > The XML Security WG would also like to note the importance of this > algorithm to US Government customers, as evidenced by their adoption > of Suite B [3]. This is reflected in the XML Security WG Use Cases > and Requirements document in section 3.5.2.3 [4]. > > These considerations can also apply to the decision of which > algorithms should be required in Widget Signature. > > Please share this additional information in your organization and > indicate if it would cause any change in position regarding the > mandatory to implement algorithms. > > Thank you > > regards, Frederick > > Frederick Hirsch, Nokia > Chair XML Security WG > > > [1] http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webapps/2009JanMar/0842.html > > [2] http://www.w3.org/2008/xmlsec/Drafts/xmldsig-core-11/Overview.htm#sec-SignatureAlg > > [3] Fact Sheet NSA Suite B Cryptography, http://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/index.shtml > > [4] http://www.w3.org/TR/2009/WD-xmlsec-reqs-20090226/#algorithm- > suiteb > > > >
Received on Wednesday, 8 April 2009 10:34:26 UTC