Re: Digital Signatures use in widgets

 >> 3. The Widgets 1.0: Digital Signatures specification will support the
 >> use of a Timestamp element. This will allow the signature to have a
 >> shorter lifetime than the certificate associated to it.

I think it should be "longer lifetime" above, right?

--Sean

Frederick Hirsch wrote:
> fyi
> 
> regards, Frederick
> 
> Frederick Hirsch
> Nokia
> 
> 
> 
> Begin forwarded message:
> 
>> *From: *"ext Priestley, Mark, VF-Group" <Mark.Priestley@vodafone.com 
>> <mailto:Mark.Priestley@vodafone.com>>
>> *Date: *December 18, 2008 8:03:53 AM EST
>> *To: *"David Rogers" <david.rogers@omtp.org 
>> <mailto:david.rogers@omtp.org>>, <public-webapps@w3.org 
>> <mailto:public-webapps@w3.org>>
>> *Cc: *"Frederick Hirsch" <frederick.hirsch@nokia.com 
>> <mailto:frederick.hirsch@nokia.com>>, "Thomas Roessler" <tlr@w3.org 
>> <mailto:tlr@w3.org>>
>> *Subject: **RE: [widgets] Digital Signatures questions for discussion*
>>
>> Hi All,
>>  
>> Marcos, Frederick and I met with Thomas at the recent W3C Security 
>> workshop and were able to answer the questions that I had put forward 
>> following the face-to-face discussion with the XML Security working 
>> group in Mandelieu.
>>  
>> In short we agreed:
>>  
>> 1. DSA-SHA256 will be specified as a second mandatory Signature 
>> Algorithm. The XML Security working group will specify the 
>> necessary URI as this is currently not available. 
>>  
>> 2. The Widgets 1.0: Digital Signature specification will mandate the 
>> use of a Usage element (in place of the profile element). This will 
>> allow signatures to be created that can be used for different purposes 
>> with different processing requirements. Exact details to be worked out.
>>  
>> 3. The Widgets 1.0: Digital Signatures specification will support the 
>> use of a Timestamp element. This will allow the signature to have a 
>> shorter lifetime than the certificate associated to it. The timestamp 
>> need not be generated by a trusted time stamp authority - it will only 
>> be valid provided that the certificates associated to the signature 
>> are also still valid (not expired or revoked)  
>>  
>> 4. The Usage and Timestamp elements will be specified in a separate 
>> specification so that they can be used by other specifications based 
>> on XML DigSig. Frederick has drafted an initial proposal 
>> at http://www.w3.org/2008/xmlsec/Drafts/xmldsig-properties/
>>  
>> Thomas/Marcos/Frederick - please feel free to correct or add to the above.
>>  
>> Comments and questions welcomed.
>>  
>> Thanks,
>>  
>> Mark
>>  
>>  
>>  
>>  
>>  
>>
>>     ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>     *From:* public-webapps-request@w3.org
>>     <mailto:public-webapps-request@w3.org> [mailto:public-webapps-request@w3.org] *On
>>     Behalf Of *David Rogers
>>     *Sent:* 14 November 2008 15:59
>>     *To:* public-webapps@w3.org <mailto:public-webapps@w3.org>
>>     *Subject:* [widgets] Digital Signatures questions for discussion
>>
>>     Dear all,
>>      
>>     In Mark Priestley’s absence, he has asked me to forward these
>>     questions for discussion within WebApps, with the intention of
>>     this group submitting  to the XML Digital Signatures group. These
>>     questions are in response to the discussions at TPAC:
>>      
>>     1. While it is recognised that there is a broad move to elliptic
>>     curve techniques, please can you provide an explanation for
>>     your recommendation that DSA should not be supported even with
>>     2048 bit keys?
>>      
>>     Note: We are aware that there is no published specification
>>     describing the use of DSA with key lengths over 1024 but there is
>>     a NIST draft[1] (publication process due to start before the end
>>     of the year). It has also been noted that there are concerns
>>     around licensing on elliptic curve technologies.
>>      
>>     2. Please can you explain in more detail how you would propose to
>>     use the profile element?
>>      
>>     3. Similarly, please can you explain how the addition of the
>>     timestamp would help with the revocation process? We assume that
>>     you require the timestamp to come from a Trusted Timestamp Authority
>>      
>>     [1] http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/fips_186-3/Draft-FIPS-186-3%20_March2006.pdf 
>>      
>>      
>>     Thanks,
>>      
>>      
>>     David.
>>      
>>     David Rogers
>>     OMTP Director of External Relations
> 

Received on Thursday, 18 December 2008 14:50:28 UTC