- From: Sebastian Trueg <trueg@openlinksw.com>
- Date: Mon, 01 Oct 2012 11:47:52 +0200
- To: public-webid@w3.org, public-xg-webid@w3.org
- Message-ID: <506966C8.6010608@openlinksw.com>
When I was introduced to WebID in my head it was mostly about authentication-related scenarios, situations in which one needs to authenticate to get access to something. Let's call them "immediate identity-proof" scenarios. In these situations a compromised private key is no big deal: you simply remove the public key from your profile and you are safe. However, when it comes to email-signing this is not practical anymore. If you would do that then suddenly all the emails you sent before the change of the key will show up as unverified in the recipients' inboxes. I briefly discussed this problem with Henry who told me that it had been discussed before[1]. In the light of us all signing our emails with WebID-enabled certificates I would like to bring this up again, find a solution, and start implementing it. The simplest way to go AFAICS would be to introduce a new property to add "expired" keys to a profile. This would retain compatibility with existing implementations which are mostly about authentication and do not need to be bothered with this extension. To get the ball rolling let me throw some Turtle at you: <#me> cert:expiredKey [ a cert:RSAPublicKey, cert:ExpiredKey; rdfs:label "Key from back when" ; cert:modulus "...." ; cert:exponent 65537 ; cert:expired "2012-06-12T12:42"^^xsd:datetime ] . (IMHO it would be much cleaner to use the good old cert:key property and just make the key another type but that might break implementations.) Using this extension email clients could still verify old emails even though the key has been compromised in the meantime. Regards, Sebastian [1] http://lists.w3.org/Archives/Public/public-webid/2012Jan/0031.html -- Sebastian Trueg Technical Consultant OpenLink Software trueg@openlinkws.com http://openlinksw.com http://trueg.wordpress.com http://www.linkedin.com/in/trueg
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Received on Monday, 1 October 2012 09:48:20 UTC