- From: Mo McRoberts <mo.mcroberts@bbc.co.uk>
- Date: Sun, 1 Jan 2012 16:38:56 +0000
- To: Kingsley Idehen <kidehen@openlinksw.com>
- Cc: public-xg-webid@w3.org
On 31 Dec 2011, at 17:52, Kingsley Idehen wrote: >> Now, because URI-A's document can't be parsed, there's no way to verify that it does contain the triples which confirm the relationship between it as a WebID URI and the WebID certificate, *however* a consumer can look for triples describing URI-A in the document referring to it retrieved from URI-B: in this case, it finds some, and can process them as being equivalent to as if they were asserted about URI-B, but what it cannot do is state that URI-A is an identifier for the certificate-holder. > > Identifier equivalence has been asserted in a signed claim via the use of multiple URIs in a Certs. SAN. The effect here is that we have synonyms so the public key associated with URI-B is now also a relation with URI-A. The fact that we can't make a union of all the data the one could de-reference via URI-A and URI-B doesn't matter re. this kind of equivalence and the resulting assurance. The problem here isn't the data. Getting the union set of triples is fine. The problem here is what you consider the URI to be for the certificate holder. As you can't retrieve and process the data for URI-A, you can't treat that URI as belonging to the holder. It's a subtle point, but it's an important one when you're dealing with synonyms. M. -- Mo McRoberts - Technical Lead - The Space, 0141 422 6036 (Internal: 01-26036) - PGP key CEBCF03E, Project Office: Room 7083, BBC Television Centre, London W12 7RJ
Received on Sunday, 1 January 2012 16:39:28 UTC