- From: Francisco Corella <fcorella@pomcor.com>
- Date: Mon, 25 Jul 2011 22:14:43 -0700 (PDT)
- To: Kingsley Idehen <kidehen@openlinksw.com>
- Cc: "public-xg-webid@w3.org" <public-xg-webid@w3.org>, Karen Lewison <kplewison@pomcor.com>
- Message-ID: <1311657283.89153.YahooMailNeo@web125510.mail.ne1.yahoo.com>
> On 7/25/11 7:34 PM, Francisco Corella wrote:
> > Kingsley,
> >
> > > On 7/24/11 8:23 PM, Kingsley Idehen wrote:
> > > > On 7/24/11 7:34 PM, Francisco Corella wrote:
> > > >> This not a theoretical issue, it is a very practical one. If
> WebID
> > > >> were used as a general purpose WebID, a malicious medical
> insurance
> > > >> company in the US could set up a health information Web site
> with
> > > >> discussion groups. If a user signed up with a WebID and joined
> a
> > > >> discussion group on cancer, the insurance company could later
> deny
> > > >> insurance to the user on suspicion that the user had cancer or
> a
> > > >> dependent who has cancer. This issue can be avoided by using
> instead
> > > >> a "login certificate" issued by the relying party itself, as we
> > > >> propose in section 4.6 of our white paper.
> > > > But, nothing about WebID implies that a personal is 'You'.
> > > >
> > > > Let's take the Spiderman and Peter Parker scenario. You can have
> WebIDs for both, and only the real identity behind either knows about
> the owl:sameAs relation.
> > > >
> > > > I am saying WebID == Who You Really Are. It just enables
> identifiers to be verified. It basically caters for alter egos etc..
> > >
> > > Meant to say:
> > >
> > > But, nothing about WebID implies that a personal URI refers to
> 'You', specifically. It just enables verifiable identifiers that are
> associated with identities :-)
> >
> > OK, WebID can be pseudonymous, but each pseudonym needs to backed by
> a
> > different web of trust, which gets tricky.
>
> No it doesn't, that's the beauty of this whole system :-) We have OWL
> and RDFS semantics as mechanisms for Trust Logics.
>
> I can assert, in my own data space, leveraging my own reasoner the
> fact that:
>
> <PeterParker> owl:sameAs <SpiderMan>.
>
> I could be the only one privy to this assertion, and be the only one
> capable of applying reasoning to this data space specific fact.
My (limited) understanding of WebID is that the relying party decides
to trust a WebID based on the position of the identity asserted by the
WebID within a trust network. What I meant to say is that, if you use
different WebIDs that assert different pseudonyms for different
relying parties, each relying party will make its trust decision based
on the trust relationships of a different pseudonym. You have to
build trust relationships for all of those pseudonyms so that each can
be trusted by the relying parties that you use it for. That's what I
think can get tricky.
>
> >
> > Anyway, independently of what identity technology you use,
> > pseudonyms
> > are not always appropriate, because they allow tracking.
>
> The whole InterWeb is laden with fingerprinting though, the key is
> ultimately about integrating anonymity at the appropriate layer. In
> this case, via WebID we do have anonymity. I can be my own IdP and the
> location of my data space could be wherever. Of course, there are some
> fingerprints, but no more than those associated with other URIs such
> as mailto: scheme URIs.
>
> > Colluding
> > real parties can share information to get a complete picture of all
> > your activities under a particular pseudonym.
>
> Yes, that's always a possibility. But it isn't one sided, I could also
> make it very hard to decipher "who I am".
>
> > You can mitigate the
> > attack by using many different pseudonyms, and being careful about
> > which pseudonym you use for which relying party. But many relying
> > parties just need to know that you are the same user who visited
> > them
> > earlier.
>
> A relying party doesn't really need to know all your identities. In
> short, this is the kicker since you should be the one asserting
> identifier co-reference(s) not the relying party .
>
> > In that case you don't need a pseudonym, or equivalently you
> > need a pseudonym that's only used for that relying party; that's
> > what
> > a "login certificate" is, in our proposal.
>
> Yes, but you can achieve that with WebID due to its underlying
> Semantic richness.
I don't doubt it. But a login certificate is a lot simpler.
>
> >
> > Preventing tracking by colluding relying parties is an explicit goal
> > of NSTIC, according to Howard Schmidt's post to the White House
> > blog,
> > at
> > http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/04/26/national-strategy-trusted-identities-cyberspace-and-your-privacy
> > .
>
> Yes, a vital goal. WebID lets you be your own IdP and that's key to
> addressing this requirement, alongside pseudonyms, anonymity, and the
> semantic prowess of RDFS and OWL :-)
Francisco
Francisco Corella, PhD
Founder & CEO, Pomcor
Twitter: @fcorella
Blog: http://pomcor.com/blog/
Web site: http://pomcor.com
>________________________________
>From: Kingsley Idehen <kidehen@openlinksw.com>
>To: Francisco Corella <fcorella@pomcor.com>
>Cc: "public-xg-webid@w3.org" <public-xg-webid@w3.org>; Karen Lewison <kplewison@pomcor.com>
>Sent: Monday, July 25, 2011 3:38 PM
>Subject: Re: WebID, BrowserID and NSTIC
>
>
>On 7/25/11 7:34 PM, Francisco Corella wrote:
>Kingsley,
>>
>>> On 7/24/11 8:23 PM, Kingsley Idehen wrote:
>>> > On 7/24/11 7:34 PM, Francisco Corella wrote:
>>> >> This not a theoretical issue, it is a very
practical one. If WebID
>>> >> were used as a general purpose WebID, a
malicious medical insurance
>>> >> company in the US could set up a health
information Web site with
>>> >> discussion groups. If a user signed up with a
WebID and joined a
>>> >> discussion group on cancer, the insurance
company could later deny
>>> >> insurance to the user on suspicion that the
user had cancer or a
>>> >> dependent who has cancer. This issue can be
avoided by using instead
>>> >> a "login certificate" issued by the relying
party itself, as we
>>> >> propose in section 4.6 of our white paper.
>>> > But, nothing about WebID implies that a personal
is 'You'.
>>> >
>>> > Let's take the Spiderman and Peter Parker
scenario. You can have WebIDs for both, and only the real
identity behind either knows about the owl:sameAs relation.
>>> >
>>> > I am saying WebID == Who You Really Are. It just
enables identifiers to be verified. It basically caters for
alter egos etc..
>>>
>>> Meant to say:
>>>
>>> But, nothing about WebID implies that a personal URI
refers to 'You', specifically. It just enables verifiable
identifiers that are associated with identities :-)
>>
>>OK, WebID can be pseudonymous, but each pseudonym needs to
backed by a
>>different web of trust, which gets tricky.
>>
>No it doesn't, that's the beauty of this whole system :-) We have
OWL and RDFS semantics as mechanisms for Trust Logics.
>
>I can assert, in my own data space, leveraging my own reasoner the
fact that:
>
><PeterParker> owl:sameAs <SpiderMan>.
>
>I could be the only one privy to this assertion, and be the only one
capable of applying reasoning to this data space specific fact.
>
>
>
>
>>Anyway, independently of what identity technology you use,
pseudonyms
>>are not always appropriate, because they allow tracking.
>The whole InterWeb is laden with fingerprinting though, the key is
ultimately about integrating anonymity at the appropriate layer. In
this case, via WebID we do have anonymity. I can be my own IdP and
the location of my data space could be wherever. Of course, there
are some fingerprints, but no more than those associated with other
URIs such as mailto: scheme URIs.
>
>
>Colluding
>>real parties can share information to get a complete picture
of all
>>your activities under a particular pseudonym.
>Yes, that's always a possibility. But it isn't one sided, I could
also make it very hard to decipher "who I am".
>
>
>You can mitigate the
>>attack by using many different pseudonyms, and being careful
about
>>which pseudonym you use for which relying party. But many
relying
>>parties just need to know that you are the same user who
visited them
>>earlier.
>>
>A relying party doesn't really need to know all your identities. In
short, this is the kicker since you should be the one asserting
identifier co-reference(s) not the relying party .
>
>
>In that case you don't need a pseudonym, or equivalently you
>>need a pseudonym that's only used for that relying party;
that's what
>>a "login certificate" is, in our proposal.
>>
>Yes, but you can achieve that with WebID due to its underlying
Semantic richness.
>
>
>
>>Preventing tracking by colluding relying parties is an
explicit goal
>>of NSTIC, according to Howard Schmidt's post to the White
House blog,
>>at
>>http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/04/26/national-strategy-trusted-identities-cyberspace-and-your-privacy .
>>
>Yes, a vital goal. WebID lets you be your own IdP and that's key to
addressing this requirement, alongside pseudonyms, anonymity, and
the semantic prowess of RDFS and OWL :-)
>
>
>Kingsley
>
>
>>Francisco
>>
>>
>>
>>Francisco Corella, PhD
>>Founder & CEO, Pomcor
>>Twitter: @fcorella
>>Blog: http://pomcor.com/blog/
>>Email: fcorella@pomcor.com
>>Web site: http://pomcor.com
>>
>>
>>>________________________________
>>>From: Kingsley Idehen <kidehen@openlinksw.com>
>>>To: public-xg-webid@w3.org
>>>Sent: Sunday, July 24, 2011 2:36 PM
>>>Subject: Re: WebID, BrowserID and NSTIC
>>>
>>>On 7/24/11 8:23 PM, Kingsley Idehen wrote:
>>>> On 7/24/11 7:34 PM, Francisco Corella wrote:
>>>>> This not a theoretical issue, it is a very
practical one. If WebID
>>>>> were used as a general purpose WebID, a
malicious medical insurance
>>>>> company in the US could set up a health
information Web site with
>>>>> discussion groups. If a user signed up with a
WebID and joined a
>>>>> discussion group on cancer, the insurance
company could later deny
>>>>> insurance to the user on suspicion that the
user had cancer or a
>>>>> dependent who has cancer. This issue can be
avoided by using instead
>>>>> a "login certificate" issued by the relying
party itself, as we
>>>>> propose in section 4.6 of our white paper.
>>>> But, nothing about WebID implies that a personal is
'You'.
>>>>
>>>> Let's take the Spiderman and Peter Parker scenario.
You can have WebIDs for both, and only the real identity
behind either knows about the owl:sameAs relation.
>>>>
>>>> I am saying WebID == Who You Really Are. It just
enables identifiers to be verified. It basically caters
for alter egos etc..
>>>
>>>Meant to say:
>>>
>>>But, nothing about WebID implies that a personal URI
refers to 'You', specifically. It just enables
verifiable identifiers that are associated with
identities :-)
>>>
>>>--
>>>Regards,
>>>
>>>Kingsley Idehen
>>>President& CEO
>>>OpenLink Software
>>>Web: http://www.openlinksw.com
>>>Weblog: http://www.openlinksw.com/blog/~kidehen
>>>Twitter/Identi.ca: kidehen
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>
>
>-- Regards, Kingsley Idehen
President & CEO
OpenLink Software
Web: http://www.openlinksw.com Weblog: http://www.openlinksw.com/blog/~kidehen Twitter/Identi.ca: kidehen
>
>
Received on Tuesday, 26 July 2011 05:15:12 UTC