- From: Peter Vojtas <peter.vojtas@mff.cuni.cz>
- Date: Wed, 09 Jan 2008 13:00:40 +0100
- To: Mitch Kokar <mkokar@ECE.NEU.EDU>
- CC: Kathryn B Laskey <klaskey@gmu.edu>, public-xg-urw3@w3.org
Dear all,
I have refined classes Agent and UncertaintyNature in our
ontology in order to be able to express the difference between human and
computer understanding of web resources. This gives us a vocabulary for
UIF (uncertainty interchange format) for annotation of uncertainty
assignements for a further processing (preferably again by machines).
I will not be able to attend today telecon
Greetings Peter
Mitch Kokar wrote:
>
> Kathy,
>
> Here are my replies to your changes.
>
> On Jan 7, 2008, at 11:44 PM, Kathryn B Laskey wrote:
>
>> Mitch,
>>
>> I made a couple of changes to the uncertainty ontology. Please look
>> them over and let me know what you think.
>>
>> I was uncomfortable with the word "random" being used as broadly as
>> you use it. The standard usage of the term random connotes a
>> phenomenon that follows a statistical law. There is much ontological
>> debate over whether randomness in this sense really exists. Most
>> people would not use the label random for sentences that have a
>> definite but unknown truth-value -- such as whether Sacco and Vanzetti
>> were guilty. Nevertheless, we can apply probability to such sentences
>> (see the book on the Sacco and Vanzetti case by Jay Kadane and Dave
>> Schum). I took the liberty of changing the term to empirical on the
>> ontology page. I haven't changed any of the diagrams, and if I'm
>> overruled we can go back -- but I really think this terminology is
>> more appropriate. Then I made randomness a subclass of empirical
>> uncertainty. I chose this terminology because that is the term used
>> by Morgan and Henrion (1990), which I have added to the reference
>> list. It is an excellent reference on uncertainty.
>
> I like your descriptions of Empirical. This is definitely a better
> description than what we had before for "Randomness". However, the name
> "empirical" seems to be strange here, but if you think this is the name
> to use, then I have no problem. The other opposite of "empirical" is
> "theoretical". So would you say that the other types (ambiguity,
> vagueness and inconsistency) are theoretical and not empirical? This
> might be the case, but it's just that I am not sure.
>
> I would prefer a different description of Randomness. You say "sentence
> is an instance of a class" - do we need the notion of class here? Could
> we just say that "there is a statistical law governing whether the
> possible worlds satisfy a sentence"? Or something of this sort?
>
>>
>>
>> I also don't think it's right to say for the case of randomness that a
>> sentence is satisfied in one of the worlds. An event in probability
>> theory is a sentence that has a definite truth-value in each world
>> (satisfies the clarity test) and is satisfied in a subset of worlds.
>> I changed the definition to correspond to this.
>
> Agreed (see above).
>>
>> I have issues with your definition of vagueness and ambiguity also.
>> For ambiguity, you say a sentence can be satisfied in many worlds.
>> Consider a sequence of 50 coin tosses, and consider the sentence that
>> the first toss is heads. This sentence is not ambiguous. Its meaning
>> is perfectly clear. It is satisfied in 2^49 of the 2^50 possible
>> worlds. I looked at many definitions of ambiguity. It means open to
>> multiple interpretations; not clearly defined. I changed the
>> definition of ambiguity to "the referents of terms in a sentence to
>> the world are not clearly specified and therefore it cannot be
>> determined whether the sentence is satisfied".
>
> I like this. In my first attempt I wanted to capture exactly what you
> mentioned above - open to multiple interpretations. Your description
> captures this much better.
>>
>> I also changed vagueness to "there is not a precise correspondence
>> between terms in the sentence and referents in the world". The
>> prototypical example of vagueness is the concept of "tall" -- each of
>> the possible worlds specifies a definite height, but there is no
>> referent in the world for the term "tall."
>>
> The example of tall is very good. This is exactly what I had mind, too.
> My intuition here points to fuzzy logic. The only problem with the
> description now is that vagueness looks very much like ambiguity.
> Perhaps we should make a reference to multi-valued logic here?
>
>> I am not thrilled with these definitions, but they are the best I
>> could do. I don't think the original definitions were tenable for the
>> reasons I've given. Does anyone care to comment or make additional
>> changes?
>>
>> I also added anchors to the wiki page, so that links can be included
>> to the WikiWords in the uncertainty ontology. For example, go to the
>> Discovery or Appointment Making use cases, which have both now been
>> annotated. If you click on, for example, UncertaintyNature, it will
>> take you to the place in the uncertainty ontology where
>> UncertaintyNature is defined.
>>
>> Kathy
>>
>> On Dec 19, 2007, at 9:19 AM, Mitch Kokar wrote:
>>
>>> Hi all,
>>>
>>> In order to annotate the "buying speakers" scenario I had to extend
>>> the Uncertainty Ontology a bit. Attached is a new version. Also
>>> attached is a graphical representation of the annotation of the
>>> scenario. I will explain the details in the telecon.
>>>
>>> ==Mitch
>>>
>>> Content-Disposition: attachment;
>>> filename=Uncertainty-v2.owl
>>> <Uncertainty-v2 1.owl><Picture 1 5.png>
>>
>
>
Received on Wednesday, 9 January 2008 12:00:52 UTC