- From: Peter Vojtas <peter.vojtas@mff.cuni.cz>
- Date: Wed, 09 Jan 2008 13:00:40 +0100
- To: Mitch Kokar <mkokar@ECE.NEU.EDU>
- CC: Kathryn B Laskey <klaskey@gmu.edu>, public-xg-urw3@w3.org
Dear all, I have refined classes Agent and UncertaintyNature in our ontology in order to be able to express the difference between human and computer understanding of web resources. This gives us a vocabulary for UIF (uncertainty interchange format) for annotation of uncertainty assignements for a further processing (preferably again by machines). I will not be able to attend today telecon Greetings Peter Mitch Kokar wrote: > > Kathy, > > Here are my replies to your changes. > > On Jan 7, 2008, at 11:44 PM, Kathryn B Laskey wrote: > >> Mitch, >> >> I made a couple of changes to the uncertainty ontology. Please look >> them over and let me know what you think. >> >> I was uncomfortable with the word "random" being used as broadly as >> you use it. The standard usage of the term random connotes a >> phenomenon that follows a statistical law. There is much ontological >> debate over whether randomness in this sense really exists. Most >> people would not use the label random for sentences that have a >> definite but unknown truth-value -- such as whether Sacco and Vanzetti >> were guilty. Nevertheless, we can apply probability to such sentences >> (see the book on the Sacco and Vanzetti case by Jay Kadane and Dave >> Schum). I took the liberty of changing the term to empirical on the >> ontology page. I haven't changed any of the diagrams, and if I'm >> overruled we can go back -- but I really think this terminology is >> more appropriate. Then I made randomness a subclass of empirical >> uncertainty. I chose this terminology because that is the term used >> by Morgan and Henrion (1990), which I have added to the reference >> list. It is an excellent reference on uncertainty. > > I like your descriptions of Empirical. This is definitely a better > description than what we had before for "Randomness". However, the name > "empirical" seems to be strange here, but if you think this is the name > to use, then I have no problem. The other opposite of "empirical" is > "theoretical". So would you say that the other types (ambiguity, > vagueness and inconsistency) are theoretical and not empirical? This > might be the case, but it's just that I am not sure. > > I would prefer a different description of Randomness. You say "sentence > is an instance of a class" - do we need the notion of class here? Could > we just say that "there is a statistical law governing whether the > possible worlds satisfy a sentence"? Or something of this sort? > >> >> >> I also don't think it's right to say for the case of randomness that a >> sentence is satisfied in one of the worlds. An event in probability >> theory is a sentence that has a definite truth-value in each world >> (satisfies the clarity test) and is satisfied in a subset of worlds. >> I changed the definition to correspond to this. > > Agreed (see above). >> >> I have issues with your definition of vagueness and ambiguity also. >> For ambiguity, you say a sentence can be satisfied in many worlds. >> Consider a sequence of 50 coin tosses, and consider the sentence that >> the first toss is heads. This sentence is not ambiguous. Its meaning >> is perfectly clear. It is satisfied in 2^49 of the 2^50 possible >> worlds. I looked at many definitions of ambiguity. It means open to >> multiple interpretations; not clearly defined. I changed the >> definition of ambiguity to "the referents of terms in a sentence to >> the world are not clearly specified and therefore it cannot be >> determined whether the sentence is satisfied". > > I like this. In my first attempt I wanted to capture exactly what you > mentioned above - open to multiple interpretations. Your description > captures this much better. >> >> I also changed vagueness to "there is not a precise correspondence >> between terms in the sentence and referents in the world". The >> prototypical example of vagueness is the concept of "tall" -- each of >> the possible worlds specifies a definite height, but there is no >> referent in the world for the term "tall." >> > The example of tall is very good. This is exactly what I had mind, too. > My intuition here points to fuzzy logic. The only problem with the > description now is that vagueness looks very much like ambiguity. > Perhaps we should make a reference to multi-valued logic here? > >> I am not thrilled with these definitions, but they are the best I >> could do. I don't think the original definitions were tenable for the >> reasons I've given. Does anyone care to comment or make additional >> changes? >> >> I also added anchors to the wiki page, so that links can be included >> to the WikiWords in the uncertainty ontology. For example, go to the >> Discovery or Appointment Making use cases, which have both now been >> annotated. If you click on, for example, UncertaintyNature, it will >> take you to the place in the uncertainty ontology where >> UncertaintyNature is defined. >> >> Kathy >> >> On Dec 19, 2007, at 9:19 AM, Mitch Kokar wrote: >> >>> Hi all, >>> >>> In order to annotate the "buying speakers" scenario I had to extend >>> the Uncertainty Ontology a bit. Attached is a new version. Also >>> attached is a graphical representation of the annotation of the >>> scenario. I will explain the details in the telecon. >>> >>> ==Mitch >>> >>> Content-Disposition: attachment; >>> filename=Uncertainty-v2.owl >>> <Uncertainty-v2 1.owl><Picture 1 5.png> >> > >
Received on Wednesday, 9 January 2008 12:00:52 UTC