- From: Thomas Roessler <tlr@w3.org>
- Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2009 13:06:57 +0200
- To: WSC WG public <public-wsc-wg@w3.org>
- Message-Id: <9C34A172-9C2E-4F5F-B809-4DE07BC5EADD@w3.org>
http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#encrypted-http-and-related-security-concerns > 2.6.2 Encrypted HTTP and related security concerns > Status: Working draft > > Anything in this specification that refers to HTTP also applies to > HTTP-over-TLS, as represented by URLsrepresenting the https scheme. > > User agents should report certificate errors to the user and must > either refuse to download resources sent with erroneous certificates > or must act as if such resources were in fact served with no > encryption. > > User agents should warn the user that there is a potential problem > whenever the user visits a page that the user has previously > visited, if the page uses less secure encryption on the second visit. > > Not doing so can result in users not noticing man-in-the-middle > attacks. > > If a user connects to a server with a self-signed certificate, the > user agent could allow the connection but just act as if there had > been no encryption. If the user agent instead allowed the user to > override the problem and then displayed the page as if it was fully > and safely encrypted, the user could be easily tricked into > accepting man-in-the-middle connections. > > If a user connects to a server with full encryption, but the page > then refers to an external resource that has an expired certificate, > then the user agent will act as if the resource was unavailable, > possibly also reporting the problem to the user. If the user agent > instead allowed the resource to be used, then an attacker could just > look for "secure" sites that used resources from a different host > and only apply man-in-the-middle attacks to that host, for example > taking over scripts in the page. > > If a user bookmarks a site that uses a CA-signed certificate, and > then later revisits that site directly but the site has started > using a self-signed certificate, the user agent could warn the user > that a man-in-the-middle attack is likely underway, instead of > simply acting as if the page was not encrypted. > > We might want to review this... Cheers, -- Thomas Roessler, W3C <tlr@w3.org>
Received on Wednesday, 14 October 2009 11:07:03 UTC