- From: Thomas Roessler <tlr@w3.org>
- Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2008 14:41:46 +0100
- To: Mary Ellen Zurko/Westford/IBM <Mary_Ellen_Zurko@notesdev.ibm.com>
- Cc: public-wsc-wg@w3.org
On 2008-03-28 09:23:15 -0400, Mary Ellen Zurko/Westford/IBM wrote: > http://www.w3.org/2006/WSC/drafts/rec/rewrite.html#sec-tlserrors > > "When the URL corresponding to the transaction at hand does not match the > certificate presented, and a validated certificate is used, then error > signalling of level warning or above (6.4.3 Warning/Caution Messages , > 6.4.4 Danger Messages) MUST be used." > > This one seems like a low ball to me. The whole point of the TLS server > authentication is to match the certificate to the URL. Why is the low bar > on this warning, instead of always danger? I think I took this from Serge's material; personally, I'd be as happy to use danger right away. > and conversely: > "If TLS negotiation otherwise fails, error signalling of level danger ( > 6.4.4 Danger Messages) MUST be used." > I have no user intuition about this. Why is this danger? Mostly because it is about the cases in which the protocol negotiation fails with a hard error -- so there is no way to proceed, even if the user ill-advisedly wanted to. -- Thomas Roessler, W3C <tlr@w3.org>
Received on Friday, 28 March 2008 13:42:24 UTC