- From: <michael.mccormick@wellsfargo.com>
- Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2008 13:27:37 -0500
- To: <johnath@mozilla.com>
- Cc: <public-wsc-wg@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <9D471E876696BE4DA103E939AE64164D01043FFE@msgswbmnmsp17.wellsfargo.com>
A user agent running with a customized user interface such as a "skin" or "persona" is within scope of this standard. Specifically such agents: 1. MUST include some minimal primary chrome where signals can be presented to the user outside of the site's control 2. SHOULD include in primary chrome the security context indicators mandated elsewhere in this standard 3. SHOULD provide alternative means of viewing security context information normally displayed in chrome that is not present (e.g., location bar) _____ From: Johnathan Nightingale [mailto:johnath@mozilla.com] Sent: Thursday, March 13, 2008 1:02 PM To: McCormick, Mike Cc: public-wsc-wg@w3.org Subject: Re: Single site browsers Feels like scope creep to me - it seems pretty unlikely that a single site browser would ever be able to claim compliance anyhow, given the lack most primary chrome. But I guess it's hard to decide either way without specific text to look at. Cheers, J On 13-Mar-08, at 1:54 PM, <michael.mccormick@wellsfargo.com> wrote: http://labs.mozilla.com/2007/10/prism/ <http://labs.mozilla.com/2007/10/prism/> http://fluidapp.com/ <http://fluidapp.com/> Should WSC take a position on single site browsers created using tools like Prism or Fluid? My biggest concern is they give users a false sense of security. "If I double click a desktop icon called Wells Fargo then the application that launches must really be Wells Fargo's." In reality SSBs are just as vulnerable to DNS poisoning, malware, & most other attacks as "normal" browsers. I would find SSBs more useful from a security perspective if they could launch the underlying browser engine with specific security preferences (no SSLv2, no JavaScript, etc.). At minimum it seems to me WSC should require SSBs (and other custom browser personas, skins, etc.) MUST always display the same security context indicators as "normal" browsers. Mike P.S. Still trying to figure out how this applies to SSB-like custom user agents such as iTunes.... Michael McCormick, CISSP Lead Security Architect, Information Security Technologies Wells Fargo Bank "THESE OPINIONS ARE STRICTLY MY OWN AND NOT NECESSARILY THOSE OF WELLS FARGO" This message may contain confidential and/or privileged information. If you are not the addressee or authorized to receive this for the addressee, you must not use, copy, disclose, or take any action based on this message or any information herein. If you have received this message in error, please advise the sender immediately by reply e-mail and delete this message. Thank you for your cooperation. --- Johnathan Nightingale Human Shield johnath@mozilla.com
Received on Thursday, 13 March 2008 18:28:57 UTC