Drop material on KCM?

Hello,

at the face-to-face on 10/23, we minuted a resolution to drop points  
5.4.1B-F (and 5.1.5E along with them).

That is, fundamentally, the material we have about Key Continuity  
Management.  Looking at the minutes in more detail, I see that the  
discussion had this agreement as tentative, specifically pending feed- 
back from Johnathan.

The text concerned is the following:
> When, for a TLS-protected HTTP connection, the certificate chain  
> presented by the server does not lead to a trusted root certificate,  
> and the certificate chain presented was not pinned to the  
> destination at hand, the following applies to user agents that are  
> capable of storing and using information about certificates that  
> were previously encountered:
>
> 	• If a validated certificate (including an augmented assurance  
> certificate) was previously presented by the same destination, then  
> error signalling of class danger (6.4.4 Danger Messages) MUST be used.
> 	• If a different certificate was previously pinned to the same  
> destination, then error signalling of class warning or higher (6.4.3  
> Warning/Caution Messages , 6.4.4 Danger Messages) MUST be used. User  
> agents MAY offer the possibility to pin the newly encountered  
> certificate to the destination at hand.
> 	• Otherwise, user agents MAY use error signalling of class  
> notification (6.4.2 Notifications and Status Indicators ) to offer  
> pinning a given certificate, consistent with 5.1.5 Self-signed  
> Certificates and Untrusted Root Certificates.
> 	• Otherwise, user agents SHOULD use error signalling of class  
> warning or higher (6.4.3 Warning/Caution Messages , 6.4.4 Danger  
> Messages).

   -- http://www.w3.org/2006/WSC/drafts/rec/rewrite.html#sec-tlserrors

Along with it goes the following language in the section on self- 
signed certificates:

> If a client is able to automatically accept a self-signed  
> certificate, or recover from similar problem without user  
> interaction, it MUST support a mechanism to store and use  
> information about certificates that were previously encountered, and  
> to detect changes against historical usage of certificates as  
> described in more detail in section 5.4.1 TLS errors.

   -- http://www.w3.org/2006/WSC/drafts/rec/rewrite.html#selfsignedcerts

Given that the decision was minuted as a tentative one, I propose  
finalizing it on an upcoming conference call.

Note that I'm commenting out the material in question in the next  
editor's draft.

--
Thomas Roessler, W3C  <tlr@w3.org>

Received on Monday, 22 December 2008 13:13:03 UTC