- From: Serge Egelman <egelman@cs.cmu.edu>
- Date: Fri, 12 Oct 2007 14:32:50 -0400
- To: Ian Fette <ifette@google.com>, yngve@opera.com, Johnathan Nightingale <johnath@mozilla.com>, W3C WSC Public <public-wsc-wg@w3.org>
Given that the attestation for a non-EV cert is control over the domain, this still applies to subdomains. So I'm not sure why all low-grade certs shouldn't use wildcards (other than more profit for CAs). Why shouldn't we just treat them this way with regard to which warnings we show? Granted, I agree with you guys about the theoretical problems. The issue is weighing these against being pragmatic. We will not be able to create effective warnings if we only consider "perfect" situations. We need to consider what is actually happening. serge Thomas Roessler wrote: > On 2007-10-12 10:30:50 -0700, Ian Fette wrote: > >> LOL... all I'm saying is this. For the case of www vs bare >> hostname, I can see this being common enough to warrant >> investigation. For the other cases, I see a lot of risk in terms >> of opening up new attack vectors, changing defaults, breaking >> standards etc, but I'm not sure I really see the benefit. > > Considering that the "real" fix for the problem is a wildcard cert, > I'm leaning toward agreeing with you on this one, my prior remark > nonwithstanding. > -- /* Serge Egelman PhD Candidate Vice President for External Affairs, Graduate Student Assembly Carnegie Mellon University Legislative Concerns Chair National Association of Graduate-Professional Students */
Received on Friday, 12 October 2007 18:33:44 UTC