- From: Serge Egelman <egelman@cs.cmu.edu>
- Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2007 00:31:38 -0400
- To: Praveen Alavilli <AlavilliPraveen@AOL.COM>
- CC: public-wsc-wg@w3.org
Well, P3P can be used for a lot more than just browsers and browser plugins (e.g., see Privacy Finder--http://www.privacyfinder.org/). But I guess that's just a technicality... serge Praveen Alavilli wrote: > I have an action [ACTION-155 OPEN Track P3P header related indicators > <http://www.w3.org/2006/WSC/track/actions/155>] which also falls into > this list of privacy and security indicators. > So I propose we close Action# 155 and contribute to this list [156]. > > thanks > Praveen > > Serge Egelman wrote: >> Both Mozilla/Firefox and IE will display an icon to indicate a >> third-party cookie has been blocked because it disagrees with the user's >> P3P preferences. >> >> Also, regarding the proxy, we've created a browser plugin that uses Tor: >> http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/foxtor/ >> The icon will indicate when the user is currently connected to a Tor >> proxy. There are a few others like this. >> >> >> serge >> >> Chuck Wade wrote: >> >>> Folks, >>> >>> I volunteered to start a thread where we begin to list the privacy and >>> security indicators that are in use today from the client side of a web >>> interaction. I'm sure that my list below is incomplete, but I'm also >>> intrigued by how many indicators are already used by one browser or >>> another, or by plugins available for popular browsers. >>> >>> * The oft-maligned, poorly-understood, "padlock" icon--perhaps the >>> most consistent indicator, but still used rather inconsistently >>> across browsers from different vendors >>> * Certificate "strength" indicators--e.g., IE's green shading in the >>> location bar for an EV cert >>> * Various "you're on a suspicious site" warnings--e.g., IE's red >>> shading of the location bar when problems are detected with the >>> cert, such as unknown authority >>> * Various warning notices that the user is about to go to a >>> suspicious site, usually with an option to allow the user to >>> override and go there anyway >>> * Notices that some content displayed was not protected by a TLS/SSL >>> session (perhaps one of the most confusing of indicators to users) >>> o A related indicator are the warnings put up by some browsers >>> that the user is about to display a "secure" page that has >>> some "insecure" content >>> * Warnings that the user is about to leave a TLS/SSL protected Web >>> session (again, a source of considerable confusion to many users) >>> * Warnings that submitted forms information will not be encrypted >>> (just what is the user supposed to do about this?) >>> * Indicators that third-party content has been blocked, often with >>> an option to allow display of such content >>> * Indicators that some content on the Web page is from third parties >>> (some browsers even make it easy for the user to distinguish >>> first-party content from third-party content. >>> * Indicators that pop-up pages have been blocked, often with an >>> option to allow the pop-up to be displayed >>> * Cookie notices--various schemes for signaling to the user that the >>> site they have visited has set cookies for the session (again, a >>> source of mythology, mystery, and mass confusion) >>> o Some browsers display warnings to users who have disabled >>> cookies that the site they are visiting wants to set a >>> cookie, and the user is asked to allow or disallow >>> * Some browsers (e.g. Firefox) offer users the option to clear >>> cookies (and other "privacy-related information") when they exit >>> the browser (either automatically, or via a dialog box) >>> * For users smart enough to constrain gratuitous use of javascripts >>> by sites they don't know, there are the various schemes for >>> letting the user know that the site they have visited is using >>> javascripts, often with options to allow javascripts from just the >>> first party or from first and third parties >>> * For those users that have heeded the warnings about not enabling >>> java downloads, there are various indicators that tell them when a >>> site is trying to download a java applet, with options to allow or >>> disallow >>> * Java applets are supposed to be signed, and some (most?) browsers >>> will warn users if an applet is not signed or is not signed by a >>> trusted authority >>> * Ditto for Active X controls (applets) >>> * File download warnings--often of the form that the file is an >>> executable or that it will run some program, such as a player (I'm >>> ignoring all the other nagware that will offer to help the user >>> check for viruses, trojans, etc. in downloaded files) >>> * Notices that a site has requested use of a plug-in that has either >>> been disabled by the user, or that is not currently installed >>> (often with helpful options to download and install the missing >>> plug-in) >>> * Various "private browsing" or safe modes that different browsers >>> offer, often with an obscure indicator, such as a checkbox in a >>> menu pick, though sometimes with a chrome indicator (note, these >>> modes usually turn off history and caching) >>> >>> >>> Imagine if automobiles presented this sort of UI clutter to drivers. >>> >>> Then, there are a few indicators that I have not encountered, but would >>> like to: >>> >>> * The cert for this site was confirmed as valid in real time by a >>> trusted authority--i.e., an OCSP lookup (an EV cert is not needed >>> for OCSP checking) >>> * Conversely, a warning when a site's cert did not provide the >>> option for OCSP checking, or the OCSP check could not be performed >>> * Visible indicators to users when they are using a proxy (maybe >>> this information needs to go to the Web site as well) >>> * An indicator that the site a user is visiting corresponds to one >>> of their set bookmarks >>> * A clear indicator of the site that will receive any submitted >>> forms data, and warnings if it does not match the primary URL >>> * A warning to a user that "the URL you just clicked is submitting >>> forms data to site XYZ; are you sure you want to do this?" >>> * The *content* of this page was digitally signed by some named >>> authority, and the signature is valid, implying the content has >>> not been altered >>> * A notice to the user when the site they just visited told three >>> other Web tracking sites about the visit, and allowed two of them >>> to set cookies on the user's computer (its a good thing most users >>> don't know how to use sniffers) >>> >>> >>> Further additions and refinements to this list would be appreciated. >>> >>> ...Chuck >>> -- >>> _____________________________ >>> Chuck Wade, Principal >>> Interisle Consulting Group >>> +1 508 435-3050 Office >>> +1 508 277-6439 Mobile >>> www.interisle.net >>> >> >> -- /* Serge Egelman PhD Candidate Vice President for External Affairs, Graduate Student Assembly Carnegie Mellon University Legislative Concerns Chair National Association of Graduate-Professional Students */
Received on Wednesday, 28 March 2007 04:31:54 UTC