- From: Mary Ellen Zurko <Mary_Ellen_Zurko@notesdev.ibm.com>
- Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2007 18:06:46 -0500
- To: "Maritza Johnson <maritzaj" <maritzaj@cs.columbia.edu>
- Cc: W3 Work Group <public-wsc-wg@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <OFEB0F9675.932080D7-ON85257266.007EBD5B-85257266.007EFCD6@LocalDomain>
Thanks Maritza.
All, from a process and schedule point of view (keep reading folks!), my
assumption (as laid out in assumptions) is that we'll do the user test
verification where testing usually occurs, between Candidate
Recommendations and Proposed Recommendations. Right now the schedule gives
us three months. So we have to either scope the testing to fit, or grow
the time estimate. Now is the time for us to put a stake in the ground on
what testing we will do. Can this fit in the timeframe? My experience is
that the hardest part to control, time wise, is lining up the
participants.
Mez
Mary Ellen Zurko, STSM, IBM Lotus CTO Office (t/l 333-6389)
Lotus/WPLC Security Strategy and Patent Innovation Architect
Maritza Johnson <maritzaj@cs.columbia.edu>
Sent by: public-wsc-wg-request@w3.org
01/10/2007 06:27 PM
To
W3 Work Group <public-wsc-wg@w3.org>
cc
Subject
Re: Section 6 - User Test Verification
I just added a cleaned up draft of this to the wiki if anyone wants to
make changes or additions.
http://www.w3.org/2006/WSC/wiki/NoteUserTestVerification
- Maritza
On Dec 26, 2006, at 3:27 AM, Maritza Johnson wrote:
Agreeing with what a few others have been saying, I think we need to lay
out who the user is.
My suggestion is to take each use case and consider what security
information is relevant to different levels of users given the task in the
use case. With this in mind, when making our recommendation we should
consider if the amount of effort necessary to extract the information is
appropriate according to the level of detail/experience of the user.
When I say depending on the task or the user's level of experience, I'm
trying to include cases when someone has the need to be concerned about
who issued a certificate, or some other detail that probably shouldn't be
displayed to everyone, but should be available on demand.
The user test verification should evaluate if the meaning of the security
cue is clear to the user, if the necessary information is available given
a reasonable amount of effort according to the task and the user's level
of experience, and if the meaning can be determined with little to no
training.
One method of user test verification would involve participants
representative of each of the user groups defined as closely as possible,
asking them to perform the tasks in the use cases, and asking questions
afterwards to gather feedback about how the felt about the security
information they were provided with. The format would be similar to an
in-lab study followed by a questionnaire.
Another way to gather feedback more directly would be to present
participants with the security cues in the context of certain tasks,
without asking them to carry out any tasks. The format would be more like
an interview, or a focus group. The participant would be shown screen
shots or something similar, and asked if the information presented was
enough to make a security decision.
With either of these methods questions to ask the participants would
include things like: Do you understand the information the cue portrays?
What does the cue suggest (to help indicate sources of confusion)? Do you
feel this information is easily accessible? Do you think enough relevant
information is displayed?
The task-based method is slightly more flexible and can be used to gather
feedback that may be more representative of how users might react in a
natural setting. It's possible to structure the study in a way that
distracts the focus from being purely on browsing securely ( which is the
case when the user is browsing at home). Similar to the user study on
phishing toolbars, the task-based user study can also be adjusted so
training is given halfway through the session so feedback can be gathered
about the effects of training on results.
Also, the task-based method can be modified to gauge whether or not a user
can be easily tricked into believing a spoofed security cue. Possible
spoofs or changes to the security cues could be presented to the
participants in the tasks to see if they fall for the fake cues. The study
would then be similar to the study in Why Phishing Works.
- Maritza
http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~maritzaj/
- Maritza
http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~maritzaj/
Received on Wednesday, 17 January 2007 23:07:00 UTC