- From: Mary Ellen Zurko <Mary_Ellen_Zurko@notesdev.ibm.com>
- Date: Wed, 17 Jan 2007 18:06:46 -0500
- To: "Maritza Johnson <maritzaj" <maritzaj@cs.columbia.edu>
- Cc: W3 Work Group <public-wsc-wg@w3.org>
- Message-ID: <OFEB0F9675.932080D7-ON85257266.007EBD5B-85257266.007EFCD6@LocalDomain>
Thanks Maritza. All, from a process and schedule point of view (keep reading folks!), my assumption (as laid out in assumptions) is that we'll do the user test verification where testing usually occurs, between Candidate Recommendations and Proposed Recommendations. Right now the schedule gives us three months. So we have to either scope the testing to fit, or grow the time estimate. Now is the time for us to put a stake in the ground on what testing we will do. Can this fit in the timeframe? My experience is that the hardest part to control, time wise, is lining up the participants. Mez Mary Ellen Zurko, STSM, IBM Lotus CTO Office (t/l 333-6389) Lotus/WPLC Security Strategy and Patent Innovation Architect Maritza Johnson <maritzaj@cs.columbia.edu> Sent by: public-wsc-wg-request@w3.org 01/10/2007 06:27 PM To W3 Work Group <public-wsc-wg@w3.org> cc Subject Re: Section 6 - User Test Verification I just added a cleaned up draft of this to the wiki if anyone wants to make changes or additions. http://www.w3.org/2006/WSC/wiki/NoteUserTestVerification - Maritza On Dec 26, 2006, at 3:27 AM, Maritza Johnson wrote: Agreeing with what a few others have been saying, I think we need to lay out who the user is. My suggestion is to take each use case and consider what security information is relevant to different levels of users given the task in the use case. With this in mind, when making our recommendation we should consider if the amount of effort necessary to extract the information is appropriate according to the level of detail/experience of the user. When I say depending on the task or the user's level of experience, I'm trying to include cases when someone has the need to be concerned about who issued a certificate, or some other detail that probably shouldn't be displayed to everyone, but should be available on demand. The user test verification should evaluate if the meaning of the security cue is clear to the user, if the necessary information is available given a reasonable amount of effort according to the task and the user's level of experience, and if the meaning can be determined with little to no training. One method of user test verification would involve participants representative of each of the user groups defined as closely as possible, asking them to perform the tasks in the use cases, and asking questions afterwards to gather feedback about how the felt about the security information they were provided with. The format would be similar to an in-lab study followed by a questionnaire. Another way to gather feedback more directly would be to present participants with the security cues in the context of certain tasks, without asking them to carry out any tasks. The format would be more like an interview, or a focus group. The participant would be shown screen shots or something similar, and asked if the information presented was enough to make a security decision. With either of these methods questions to ask the participants would include things like: Do you understand the information the cue portrays? What does the cue suggest (to help indicate sources of confusion)? Do you feel this information is easily accessible? Do you think enough relevant information is displayed? The task-based method is slightly more flexible and can be used to gather feedback that may be more representative of how users might react in a natural setting. It's possible to structure the study in a way that distracts the focus from being purely on browsing securely ( which is the case when the user is browsing at home). Similar to the user study on phishing toolbars, the task-based user study can also be adjusted so training is given halfway through the session so feedback can be gathered about the effects of training on results. Also, the task-based method can be modified to gauge whether or not a user can be easily tricked into believing a spoofed security cue. Possible spoofs or changes to the security cues could be presented to the participants in the tasks to see if they fall for the fake cues. The study would then be similar to the study in Why Phishing Works. - Maritza http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~maritzaj/ - Maritza http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~maritzaj/
Received on Wednesday, 17 January 2007 23:07:00 UTC