- From: Kazuyuki Ashimura <ashimura@w3.org>
- Date: Mon, 20 Sep 2021 20:00:27 +0900
- To: public-wot-ig@w3.org, public-wot-wg@w3.org
available at:
https://www.w3.org/2021/07/26-wot-sec-minutes.html
also as text below.
Thanks,
Kazuyuki
---
[1]W3C
[1] https://www.w3.org/
WoT Security
26 July 2021
[2]Agenda. [3]IRC log.
[2] https://www.w3.org/WoT/IG/wiki/IG_Security_WebConf#26_July_2021
[3] https://www.w3.org/2021/07/26-wot-sec-irc
Attendees
Present
Kaz_Ashimura, Michael_McCool, Oliver_Pfaff,
Philipp_Blum, Tomoaki_Mizushima
Regrets
Elena_Reshetova
Chair
McCool
Scribe
kaz
Contents
1. [4]Minutes
2. [5]Meeting schedule in August
3. [6]Best Practices
1. [7]Issue 13
Meeting minutes
Minutes
[8]July-19
[8] https://www.w3.org/2021/07/19-wot-sec-minutes.html
McCool: any objections?
(none; approved)
Meeting schedule in August
McCool: vacation in August
… starting with the next week
… and cancel all the Security call in August
(Aug 2-23 Security meetings will be cancelled)
Best Practices
Issue 13
[9]PR 20 - Cleanup
[9] https://github.com/w3c/wot-security-best-practices/pull/20
[10]PR 19 - Add Ed Note to Object Security
[10] https://github.com/w3c/wot-security-best-practices/pull/19
[11]PR 21 - Add local TLS/DTLS security via Raw Public Keys
[11] https://github.com/w3c/wot-security-best-practices/pull/21
McCool: some clean up PRs as above
[12]Issue 13 - Update Secure Local Transport
[12] https://github.com/w3c/wot-security-best-practices/issues/13
McCool: how to generate a PR for that?
Oliver: a bit different form of secure transport
McCool: would like to mention some proxy as well
… (adds comments to Issue 13)
… expectations around mutual authentication, etc.
… would be useful to distinguish "key distribution" from
"secure transport"
… but we have to decide where certain parts go, e.g., mutual
authentication
… also question of managing permissions
Oliver: would look into the NETCONF RFCs
… 6241
[13]RFC6241
[13] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6241
[14]more specifically, section 2.2
[14] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6241#section-2.2
Oliver: talks about authentication
… meant for network configuration, not specifically for Web
… there is also RESTCONF
[15]RFC8040
[15] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8040
McCool: anonymous service for IoT
Oliver: you'd like to learn NETCONF for encryption, etc.
… similar constraints like the ones we have
McCool: original intent of Philipp was to support a secure PKS
key distribution
… typically we see the key during the onboarding process
… would assume something like OAuth for tokens
… some kind of mechanism for people to access multiple devices
… but how do you know who to generate the token, and how to get
it?
Philipp: also what kind of clients are available
… core issue here is how to distribute the keys
McCool: yeah
… want to be able to target the problem of a larg number of
users and devices
… also being able to manage different/dynamic permissions for
different users
… want to avoid configuration for each device every time
… we should look into standards on key distribution
… or at least de-facto mechanism
… are there an existing best practices?
… CA is one such system but requries that servers have a public
URL
… LDAP is another possibility but that is just a distributed
directory; CAN hod keys
Oliver: LDAP is basically a directory and doesn't handle
security itself
… but you can run LDAP over TLS
McCool: what we want to do is not recommending something new
but unusual
<citrullin> [16]https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/
rfc7250#section-1
[16] https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7250#section-1
McCool: we'd like to see the existing best practices
… what do people actually use?
… (found a research paper about key management)
[17]Towards Formally Verified Key Management for Industrial
Control Systems
[17] https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3372020.3391555
McCool: probably should define some terms
… and then some suitable options for different "modules"
… e.g., for secure transport and for key distribution
… problem with TLS 1.2 is can't use raw public keys...
Oliver: raw public key was available before. will check the
specification again
McCool: use cases for browsers
… accessing public URLs
… relate to how we deal with proxies, tunnels, etc.
… also reverse/forward proxies
<citrullin> [18]https://success.qualys.com/discussions/s/
question/0D52L00004TnvRc/
using-raw-public-keys-in-transport-layer-security-tls-and-datag
ram-transport-layer-security-dtls
[18] https://success.qualys.com/discussions/s/question/0D52L00004TnvRc/using-raw-public-keys-in-transport-layer-security-tls-and-datagram-transport-layer-security-dtls
<citrullin> [19]https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/
show_bug.cgi?id=1050175
[19] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1050175
McCool: perhaps we simply say "if you want to access a system
though a browser, nee to access system via a public URL secured
by a certificate."
… then we simply have to discuss the privacy implications
[20]McCool's comments
[20] https://github.com/w3c/wot-security-best-practices/issues/13#issuecomment-886673831
Philipp: gave some resources above
… the first link above is about Using Raw Public Keys in TLS
and DTLS
(which mentions Firefox nightly supports client side TLS 1.3
McCool: (adds another comment to Issue 13)
… some browsers may support import of raw public keys and/or
integration with PS systems
… if one exists, then we can give this as an option in
environments where putting public URLs for access devices is
not desirable.
[adjourned]
Minutes manually created (not a transcript), formatted by
[21]scribe.perl version 136 (Thu May 27 13:50:24 2021 UTC).
[21] https://w3c.github.io/scribe2/scribedoc.html
Received on Monday, 20 September 2021 11:00:38 UTC