W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > whatwg@whatwg.org > December 2011

[whatwg] Behavior when <script> is removed from DOM

From: Yehuda Katz <wycats@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Dec 2011 15:23:18 -0800
Message-ID: <CAMFeDTVsBggdXAUP1bh=uTnXVrXGdCYbVdwqqBbLwKejcrGXVw@mail.gmail.com>
Yehuda Katz
(ph) 718.877.1325


On Thu, Dec 8, 2011 at 3:15 PM, Mark S. Miller <erights at google.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Thursday, December 8, 2011, Yehuda Katz wrote:
>
>>
>> Yehuda Katz
>> (ph) 718.877.1325
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Dec 8, 2011 at 9:23 AM, Mark S. Miller <erights at google.com>wrote:
>>
>>> Given only that the JSONP response has a ACCESS-CONTROL-ALLOW-ORIGIN:*
>>> header, the API you suggest below can be fully implemented as a library.
>>>
>>> Since any response that parses as JavaScript has no same origin
>>> protection anyway, rather than carve out a special case for JSONP, should
>>> we waive the ACCESS-CONTROL-ALLOW-ORIGIN:* requirement on responses that
>>> parse as JavaScript for XHR requests in general? If not, what justifies
>>> carving out a special case for JSONP?
>>>
>>
>> In the general case, executed JavaScript does not expose the content.
>>
>
> The legacy content we're concerned with is written to work on ES3
> browsers. By overriding "Object" and "Array", or by other subterfuge, you
> can corrupt an ES3 environment adequately to violate the confidentiality of
> scripts loaded later into the same frame. Anne Van Kesteren pointed out the
> only form of confidentiality we can be confident of in this context:
> comments (and whitespace and choice of internal variable names). Are these
> secrets worth giving up on the safety that could result from loading these
> scripts as data, so that we could then run them in a restricted manner
> (whether by translation, verification, or other tricks, e.g., SES)?
>
>
>
>> Existing JSONP implementations obviously work as libraries, but
>> implementing them robustly is non-trivial. Given that we know that this
>> subset is already secure (or at least, doesn't add any new security
>> issues), creating an explicit API that eliminated the library fiddliness
>> (and need for registering a global function) would be great.
>>
>
> That you say "registering a global function" leaves me suspecting you
> don't understand my suggestion. Assuming ES5 and some form of
> origin-independent or cross-origin xhr, very simple JavaScript code can
> fetch the JSONP payload as data, strip the prefix and suffix, and use
> JSON.parse on the remaining string. I mean, c'mon, it's probably a one
> liner. Do we really need to add a new special case to the security
> architecture of the browser in order to avoid this one liner?
>

I'm probably still misunderstanding, but the current security
infrastructure of the web supports cross-origin XHR only with a new kind of
explicit server opt-in that most APIs do not support.


>
>
>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 7, 2011 at 5:20 PM, Jonas Sicking <jonas at sicking.cc> wrote:
>>>
>>>> On Wed, Dec 7, 2011 at 3:55 PM, Yehuda Katz <wycats at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> >
>>>> > Yehuda Katz
>>>> > (ph) 718.877.1325
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> > On Wed, Dec 7, 2011 at 3:43 PM, Jonas Sicking <jonas at sicking.cc>
>>>> wrote:
>>>> >>
>>>> >> On Wed, Dec 7, 2011 at 12:39 PM, Yehuda Katz <wycats at gmail.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>> >> > Yehuda Katz
>>>> >> > (ph) 718.877.1325
>>>> >> >
>>>> >> >
>>>> >> > On Wed, Dec 7, 2011 at 12:29 PM, Boris Zbarsky <bzbarsky at mit.edu>
>>>> wrote:
>>>> >> >
>>>> >> >> On 12/7/11 3:22 PM, Joshua Bell wrote:
>>>> >> >>
>>>> >> >>> This can't be implemented in JS today (e.g. as a shim) since that
>>>> >> >>> "evaluate
>>>> >> >>> this script text in this new global sandbox" bit isn't present.
>>>> >> >>>
>>>> >> >>
>>>> >> >> It can sort of be done via opening a new window and setting its
>>>> opener
>>>> >> >> to
>>>> >> >> null before injecting some <script> tags into it.  Modulo popup
>>>> >> >> blockers
>>>> >> >> and crappy user experience, of course....
>>>> >> >
>>>> >> >
>>>> >> > Or evaluating the script inside a worker, perhaps?
>>>> >>
>>>> >> Workers aren't great sandboxes. They already have access to shared
>>>> >> workers and XHR. Soon they will get access to IndexedDB too. So
>>>> >> there's lots of damage they can cause.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> If we want to run untrusted code then I think we need to have an API
>>>> >> specifically designed for that.
>>>> >>
>>>> >> If we want an API for loading JSONP data apart from the sandbox
>>>> (which
>>>> >> I think is needed), then we should have an API specifically designed
>>>> >> for that. It's possible that we can reuse XHR here and just adjust
>>>> the
>>>> >> security model when the returned data is JSONP.
>>>> >
>>>> >
>>>> > You would at least want to execute them in a lexical scope containing
>>>> the
>>>> > callback, so that the callback did not need to be installed on the
>>>> global
>>>> > scope.
>>>>
>>>> Ideally we wouldn't execute anything. We'd just parse the JSON literal
>>>> and hand that back. That is what'll give us safety.
>>>>
>>>> To make a concrete, but hideous, example:
>>>>
>>>> We could add xhr.responseType = "jsonp".
>>>>
>>>> When this is set, the XHR object will look for contents on the
>>>> following form:
>>>>
>>>> <js identifier> '(' <js-literal> ')'
>>>>
>>>> followed by an optional ';'
>>>>
>>>> When the contents follows that syntax, the XHR object parses the
>>>> js-literal and sets it's .response property to the result.
>>>>
>>>> Other than that the XHR object works just as it currently does. I.e.
>>>> it fires progress events, load events and readystatechange events as
>>>> normal.
>>>>
>>>> This way no JS execution happens, and no global names need to be set
>>>> up. The <js identifier> part is simply ignored other than to check
>>>> that it's a valid js identifier.
>>>>
>>>> I believe we can come up with something better than this, but it's a
>>>> demonstration of what's technically feasible.
>>>>
>>>> / Jonas
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> --
>>>     Cheers,
>>>     --MarkM
>>>
>>
>>
>
> --
>     Cheers,
>     --MarkM
>
Received on Thursday, 8 December 2011 15:23:18 UTC

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.4.0 : Wednesday, 22 January 2020 16:59:38 UTC