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[whatwg] <object> behavior

From: Ola P. Kleiven <olak@opera.com>
Date: Sun, 18 Oct 2009 14:40:23 +0200
Message-ID: <op.u1zxhlg8nw228i@id-c0437>
On Sun, 18 Oct 2009 14:21:56 +0200, Ben Laurie <benl at google.com> wrote:

> On Sun, Oct 18, 2009 at 5:37 AM, Ian Hickson <ian at hixie.ch> wrote:
>> On Fri, 16 Oct 2009, Ben Laurie wrote:
>>> > On Thu, 6 Aug 2009, Andrew Oakley wrote:
>>> >>
>>> >> - Should the type attribute take precedence over the Content-Type
>>> >> header?
>>> >
>>> > No, I believe what the spec says here is the preferred behaviour.
>>> > Unless this is incompatible with legacy content, we should try to  
>>> move
>>> > towards this behaviour.
>>> I realise this is only one of dozens of ways that HTML is unfriendly to
>>> security, but, well, this seems like a bad idea - if the page thinks it
>>> is embedding, say, some flash, it seems like a pretty bad idea to allow
>>> the (possibly untrusted) site providing the "flash" to run whatever it
>>> wants in its place.
>> If the site is untrusted, yet you are letting it run flash, then you've
>> lost already. Flash can inject arbitrary JS into your page.
> Perhaps I am failing to understand, but if I embed anything from an
> untrusted site, then it can choose what type it is - so how would I
> prevent it running Flash?

Running Flash and allowing the same Flash to script your page are two  
different things. Flash needs allowscriptaccess="always" to script if it  
is loaded from a different domain. This may not be true for all plug-ins  

Ola P. Kleiven, Core Compatibility, Opera Software
Received on Sunday, 18 October 2009 05:40:23 UTC

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