Re: Move forward with Key control APIs

On 12 January 2015 at 06:10, Stefan Håkansson LK
<stefan.lk.hakansson@ericsson.com> wrote:
> #1. Anonymous calling: the correspondent doesn't care who the other side
> is, so no identification is needed.
> #2. Identified calling: there's some chain of evidence linking the
> crypto keys used for the call to some mutually-known identity (probably
> via an identity provider).

This is separate to, and separable from, the identity work.  It's
mostly useful in the absence of identity, though it can have some
limitation application when identity is involved.

With Tim's example, key continuity provides pseudonymous
identification of a peer.  However useful this is in some cases,
linkability of this sort is a real liability when it comes to
anonymous calling.

Thus the proposal, which is to have every PeerConnection instance use
new credentials unless an application overrides that.  That partly
assumes we can agree to mandate ECDSA rather than RSA due to the cost
of RSA key generation on limited clients.  I think that Justin
currently has the token on that part of the issue.

I don't think that there is any more to it than that.  Richard and
Ryan seem to be arguing more over the interpretation of this basic
requirement.  I don't see any evidence of a lack of understanding
there, more a disagreement over how to interpret and address it.

My suggestion is that you tell the interested parties to sort it out
between themselves and come back with a recommendation to the group.
I'm happy to translate any conclusion they make into a pull request.

Received on Monday, 12 January 2015 23:53:28 UTC