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Re: CSP/CORS (Re: ICE exposes 'real' local IP to javascript)

From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 4 Feb 2015 17:21:13 +1100
Message-ID: <CABkgnnW0rvmcT3VYXq=NPJ==mv54bRXuf==Nde4+xKt8Cd0dQg@mail.gmail.com>
To: Harald Alvestrand <harald@alvestrand.no>
Cc: "public-webrtc@w3.org" <public-webrtc@w3.org>
I can't think of any application of CSP or CORS in this context.  We
already have consent mechanisms equivalent to CORS in the form of ICE.
And CSP serves only as a voluntary reduction in capabilities on the
part of a site.

On 4 February 2015 at 16:45, Harald Alvestrand <harald@alvestrand.no> wrote:
> Limiting to Webrtc and changing subject....
> On 02/03/2015 09:41 PM, Göran Eriksson AP wrote:
>> Inline
>>> 2) Speaking with my WebRTC hat on: IP addresses have to be surfaced at the
>>> API as long as the other side needs to try to send packets to these interfaces.
>>> We can't obfuscate them or encrypt them because they have to be
>>> communicated to the other party, through channels that aren't in the
>>> WebRTC spec.
>> [GAPE:] OK, sure, that would fit in IETF. But CSP/CORS are within the W3C scope, right? For instance, consider using Web platform mechanisms such as CSP; that should be in the scope of the W3C draft, right? Something along the lines Web site admin using CSP/CORS to have the UA 'check' the 'find&connect' proxy origin (especially when it is not in the same 'origin' as that of the parent document)?
> Can you explain in more detail what you mean here - what exactly are you
> suggesting be checked with CSP/CORS?
> As far as I understand, if the "attack" is like the "you have this IP
> address" Web pages we've seen, all the resources that the page needs
> access to are either wide open or under the control of the "attacker" -
> and the user has already performed the "engagement gesture" - he clicked
> on the link to the page.
> CSP/CORS is, I believe, intended to make sure a page doesn't reach out
> to resources outside what it is supposed to have access to - but in the
> "you have this IP address" page, all the resources it needs access to
> are (potentially) controlled by the page's author - so even if we had
> protocol details to verify access, what is it that we would be using
> CSP/CORS to check against?
> If there are mechanisms that are relevant, I think I need some more
> explanation before I get what they are.
Received on Wednesday, 4 February 2015 06:21:44 UTC

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