- From: Jan-Ivar Bruaroey via GitHub <sysbot+gh@w3.org>
- Date: Fri, 03 Sep 2021 14:42:33 +0000
- To: public-webrtc-logs@w3.org
> Right, and this is something that Safari prohibits. @youennf Firefox Nightly appears to block it as well FWIW (just an observation). > If they are both connected to the Internet, they can find each other @eladalon1983 True. Parties may also (co-)own both evil.com and collaborator.com outright, rendering communication between them unnecessary. This is why we should never pre-select a picker choice for instance. There's no silver bullet here (that's https://github.com/w3c/mediacapture-screen-share/issues/182). All we can do is try making it more costly to exploit, and make the minimum necessary activity look slightly more suspicious. Relatively speaking: 1. A site opening new tabs seems (marginally) more suspicious than one that doesn't 2. A site presenting the user with a different domain in the URL bar seems more suspicious than one that doesn't 3. A site that does both should raise more suspicion than 1 and 2. This may not be a lot, but I also don't think that means we should allow self-capture of the same tab outright. > It seems valuable to me to provide as precise as possible guidelines. I think looking at same-origin (minus port?) of both the requesting doc and its opener (chain?) are interesting ideas. But we're also discussing heuristics at this point, so I wouldn't prevent a UA from going further (e.g. using a deny list or other inputs besides these heuristics into some risk score that determines whether to trigger a warning (or block/hide) based on it). -- GitHub Notification of comment by jan-ivar Please view or discuss this issue at https://github.com/w3c/mediacapture-screen-share/issues/184#issuecomment-912591762 using your GitHub account -- Sent via github-notify-ml as configured in https://github.com/w3c/github-notify-ml-config
Received on Friday, 3 September 2021 14:42:35 UTC