Re: Proof of Concept: Identity Credentials Login

On 6/10/14 7:21 PM, Dave Longley wrote:
>> Okay, but I am also demonstrating to you that competitive pressures and
>> >"opportunity costs" are the keys to getting browser vendors to respond.
>> >Right now we have IE, Firefox, and Safari working fine, which leaves
>> >Opera and Chrome.
>> >
>> >The top browsers across desktop, notebooks, tablets, palmtops, and
>> >phones don't have a TLS CCA problem.
> "Working fine" is subjective. I disagree that there isn't a TLS CCA
> problem, but, like Manu, won't argue the point and will wait to see if
> WebID+TLS gains any traction.
>
>
"Working fine" means that across IE, Safari, and Firefox, I can 
demonstrate the fact that you don't have to restart any of the 
aforementioned browsers in a quest to change the identity of the agent 
seeking at access a protected resource.

Simple example, you have a protected resource denoted by the URI/URL: 
<http://example.org/doc/private.html> , using an ACL that grants 
read-write privileges to WebIDs: <#i> and 
<http://kingsley.idehen.net/dataspace/person/kidehen#this> . My 
demonstrable claim [1] is that you will not need to restart Firefox, 
Safari, or IE in order to access said protected resources using either 
WebID. That's the crux of the matter re. browsers UI/UX and WebID-TLS.

Links:

[1] http://id.myopenlink.net/ods/webid_demo.html -- my live 
demonstration that refutes the CCA & WebID-TLS UI/UX claims .


-- 

Regards,

Kingsley Idehen 
Founder & CEO
OpenLink Software
Company Web: http://www.openlinksw.com
Personal Weblog: http://www.openlinksw.com/blog/~kidehen
Twitter Profile: https://twitter.com/kidehen
Google+ Profile: https://plus.google.com/+KingsleyIdehen/about
LinkedIn Profile: http://www.linkedin.com/in/kidehen