- From: Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com>
- Date: Fri, 01 Nov 2013 05:14:45 +0100
- To: "David I. Lehn" <dil@lehn.org>
- CC: Web Payments CG <public-webpayments@w3.org>
On 2013-11-01 02:32, David I. Lehn wrote: > On Tue, Oct 22, 2013 at 8:08 AM, Anders Rundgren > <anders.rundgren.net@gmail.com> wrote: >> For payment operations you ought to have a trusted GUI. >> It would be nice to get a list of possible options for achieving this. >> > > The problem with most GUIs is that an attacker can emulate what the > GUI looks like and intercept your secure data. You could show secrets > (pictures, etc, etc) that are only accessible via the trusted GUI. > But then you have to make sure users understand how and why to set > that up properly, and ensure that they are trained to notice if those > secrets do not appear. That seems like the hard part. Exactly. I would go further and claim that it is impossible. If we stick to payments, there is actually a working method which is already established since years back for some smart cards: It builds on the idea that the important thing is inside of the card that can only be activated through an authorization code coming from a terminal that the _card_ trusts. If a user accidentally inserts his/her card in a "bad" terminal, the owner of the bad terminal may indeed get the authorization code but won't be able to exploit this knowledge except by stealing the card which is not an Internet-scale attack [*]. I have outlined such a scheme in a recently upgraded paper where the payment terminal is an enhanced browser and the card [presumably] is an embedded secure element: http://webpki.org/papers/PKI/pki-webcrypto.pdf The alternative seems to be installing trusted payment applications but I don't think the payment industry generally trust users (or browser vendors...) for performing such decisions. With the devised scheme they don't have to. I also do not believe that payment networks suddenly will "unite" on a single trusted application. Such decisions are left to the market (where it IMO belongs). Anders *] for some security folks this limitation is unacceptable but they are IMO living in a theoretical world where you have personal PIN-pad readers Related: http://xkcd.com/538 > > -dave >
Received on Friday, 1 November 2013 04:15:20 UTC