- From: Daniel Friesen <daniel@nadir-seen-fire.com>
- Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2013 07:01:48 -0700
- To: Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com>
- CC: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>, "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, Carsten Bormann <cabo@tzi.org>, Web Payments CG <public-webpayments@w3.org>, "ietf-http-wg@w3.org" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
On 13-04-18 6:42 AM, Manu Sporny wrote: > On 04/17/2013 08:00 PM, Martin Thomson wrote: >> Yeah, that's a pretty bad. Switching two date-formatted headers >> might be a simple thing to gain advantage on. (Last-Modified and >> Date, might work to poison a cache with old content if the cache >> isn't rigorous about checking Date). It seems like a simple fix >> would be to include the list of headers under the signature as the >> first item. > Carsten, James, Martin - good catch, thanks. We had assumed that the > implementation included the headers names as well as the values in the > data being digitally signed. As Dave Lehn pointed out, this is a work in > progress, but we wanted to get something out as sooner than later. > > The attack is only possible if a message is passed over a non-secure > channel, right? That is, the spec is clear about passing all messages > over HTTPS. Granted, that's not an excuse for the approach taken and it > should be fixed, but the attack is only possible if messages are sent > over an insecure channel, correct? > > -- manu > You might want to think twice before you consider https implemented in anything other than a web browser absolutely secure: http://hueniverse.com/2010/09/oauth-bearer-tokens-are-a-terrible-idea/ ~Daniel Friesen (Dantman, Nadir-Seen-Fire) [http://danielfriesen.name/]
Received on Thursday, 18 April 2013 14:02:22 UTC